The Hoosier Gadfly

As I write this, the nominees presumptive of their respective parties are Barack Obama and John McCain. Although I fully expect the oil bubble to burst at some point in the not too distant future, with gasoline topping $4 a gallon, McCain and the Republicans have found a very strong issue in calling for the expansion of domestic oil exploration and easing restrictions on new refinery construction. What makes this issue so strong is that two-thirds of the public believe that offshore oil exploration should resume and, further, that it would reduce gasoline prices. Moreover, for over thirty years the Democratic Party has ”been in thrall to the eco-fascists” and has resolutely opposed expanding every conventional domestic energy source in favor of expensive and utterly impractical “alternatives”. Far from being the party of the working man, the Democratic Party is the party of the snail darter, the spotted owl, and the polar bear.

The Democrats have been thrown on the defensive and, unable to change their radical environmental, anti-technology ideology, have been forced to rely on bumper sticker rhetoric: “You can’t drill your way out of scarcity”. Worse, for them, some of their confreres are beginning to say what they really think: U.S. Representatives Maxine Waters of California and Maurice Hinchey of New York have called for nationalizing the oil industry or parts thereof. With Obama being the most left-wing member of the Senate, suspected by many of being a closet Marxist, this offers the GOP the perfect opportunity for a viral video and/or a commercial calling attention to the stark difference between the two parties. Here is what I envision:

FADE IN: A red flag with hammer and sickle is waving. An a cappella male chorus sings “The Internationale” in Russian (I like the first a cappella version here). First, a picture of Karl Marx appears. This fades and is replaced with a clip of Lenin speaking. There follows a clip of Stalin reviewing a May Day Parade, Krushchev banging his shoe at the U.N., Fidel Castro haranguing a crowd, Leonid Brezhnev reviewing yet another May Day Parade, then, abruptly the music stops in mid-phrase and there stands Ronald Reagan delivering the lines, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” Cut to a scene of cheering crowds tearing down the Berlin wall. FADE OUT
FADE IN: A clip of Maxine Waters threatening to [sic] “socialize” the oil companies. As she speaks, the camera should begin to pull back and it becomes apparent that the image is on a TV. This is replaced by Maurice Hinchey talking about nationalizing the oil refineries. Pulling back farther, the camera reveals a couple of guys (they should be identifiable as “Reagan Democrats” – t-shirts and/or baseball caps with union slogans) watching the TV. One turns to the other and says, “Gee, I thought we won the Cold War.”
FADE OUT: The words, “VOTE REPUBLICAN” appear.

I think this could easily be a 60 second commercial though it would work as a 2 minute viral video as well.

If anyone in the RNC reads this, I give you full rights to put it together. If anyone else wants to make it, contact me first.

Although it has been an interesting political season, even the prospect of an Obama-Hillary / Hillary-Obama shotgun wedding officiated by Howard Dean has been insufficient to motivate me to blog. However, a couple of recent events merit some commentary.

The first was from early last month when Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, admitted that the release of the Key Judgments summary of the NIE to the public created the false impression that Iran was no longer developing nuclear weapons. During the questioning by Senator Evan Bayh (D – Indiana), the following exchange occurred:

MR. MCCONNELL: I think I would change the way that we describe nuclear program; I mean, put it up front, a little diagram, what are the component parts so that the reader could quickly grasp that a portion of it, I would argue, maybe even at least significant portion, was halted and there are other parts that continue.

SEN. BAYH: Well, just to clarify the record, and I’m referring only to the public NIE. And I’ve read it. My synopsis of it — and I’d be interested if any of you would disagree with this — was that they had an active — all three components: fissile material creation, weaponization, delivery systems. All those were going forward. They decided a few years ago to suspend one component; as you characterize it, the least consequential of the three — at least temporarily they decided to suspend it. They could recommence that at any point in time.

MR. MCCONNELL: They could.

SEN. BAYH: It would be very difficult for us, as I think you pointed out, to know when they have recommenced that, and ultimately, given their industrial and technological capabilities, they are likely to be successful. We don’t know exactly when, but ultimately they’re likely to be successful.

MR. MCCONNELL: Yes, sir.

SEN. BAYH: Is that a fair synopsis?

MR. MCCONNELL: That’s exactly right. And that’s what the unclassified — if you read them all the way through, that’s unclassified key judgment — make that point, and then there’s the full body of the 140 pages also, and (they did make that ?) point.

SEN. BAYH: Well, so my question to you is, you know, it’s difficult when we just, you know, have one footnote that kinds of clarifies, as I say — how can you and your people go about presenting this in a way that is more likely to have a balanced presentation of your beliefs, to avoid the kind of problem we’ve now got ourselves in going forward? And how can you think through the consequences of the report? Because it’s had unintended consequences that in my own view are damaging to the national security interests of our country.

MR. MCCONNELL: Sir, it’s a challenge. We tried, in the time we had left, to do just what you said. I thought at the moment, at that point in time, we had gotten good balance. In retrospect, I — as I mentioned, I would do some things differently.

[Emphasis added, otherwise unedited]

We need not concern ourselves with the remainder of the exchange, where McConnell offers the absurd and self-serving argument that the release of the Key Judgments summary didn’t damage U.S. national security by making it more difficult to pressure Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

The establishment media gave McConnel’s admissions about the NIE scant coverage – obviously it was too embarrassing for journalists to acknowledge both their excessive credulity and ignorance about such an important topic. Besides, given the political bias of the media, the fact that so many prominent Democrats – in particular, Democratic Presidential candidates – relied on the flawed NIE to attack the Bush Doctrine undermines their claims of foreign policy expertise. It is only acceptable for the establishment media to question Bush’s expertise.

The second development is that there is good reason to question the NIE’s assertion that weaponization, in the form of warhead development, was halted by Iran in 2003. Recall that back in December, I stated my view that warhead development had not ceased at all. Now, a 13 March 2008 article in Jane’s International Defense Review (paid subscription required) titled “Evidence emerges of Iran’s continued nuclear weapons research” vindicates my assertion. Jane’s claims to have seen evidence of long term weapons development from “a source connected to a Western intelligence service” and that said evidence was “verified by a number of reliable independent sources in Vienna.” This evidence relates to developments in the implosion technology necessary for a plutonium device and essential in reducing the amount of fissile material needed for a uranium device. According to Jane’s, Iran has made “great strides” in this critical technology. Further, this weaponization program has been ongoing, which flatly contradicts the NIE “judgment” that Iran suspended that part of nuclear program back in 2003. Q.E.D.

The article goes on to discuss the organization of the weapons program (known as AMAD - full Farsi name: Sazemaneh Tarhe Amade Vije - Organisation for Planning and Special Supplies, OPSS) as well as specifics about the technologies under development. Aside from implosion technology, AMAD, is also developing a “payload with a diameter of 60 cm” with an eye toward fitting this inside the conical warhead of the Shahab-3”. Jane’s notes that this is a departure from the “tri-conic” or baby bottle warhead variants observed 3 years ago in a military parade which were thought to be a nuclear warhead design.

About the only positive thing that can be said about the state of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is that its schedule has been “moving to the right” and is progressing slower than might be expected. This is no argument in favor of complacency. Iran is obviously very close to having fully weaponized nuclear – I maintain thermonuclear – devices. If Bush doesn’t take action, it will probably be too late for the next President to do anything except develop policies for how to deal with a nuclear Iran.

I hadn’t planned to comment on the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate – others with much better credentials than I have done so (notably John Bolton in the Washington Post). However, none of them offered the best refutation, although Henry Kissinger in a 13 December editorial came close. Kissinger pointed out that the “Key Judgments” part of the NIE that was released to the public had its most widely quoted statement footnoted with information that it was the construction of warheads that Iran had halted. This, said Kissinger, is only one aspect of a nuclear weapons program and “not even the most significant one.”

The Key Judgments is only a few pages, most of which is explanatory material for a few conclusory statements. The only one that matters is “A”, which begins:

A. We judge with high confidence that in the fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program;…

This phrase is footnoted:

For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.

So, what does “design and weaponization” mean? Kissinger is correct that this relates to having a nuclear device that can be deployed in the field and used as a weapon. For example, the first true thermonuke (that is, hydrogen bomb) was a huge construction of piping and cryotanks that used liquid hydrogen. This U.S. built device could never be used a weapon. When the Soviets detonated their first thermonuke it was a lithium deuteride “dry bomb” dropped from a bomber. Thus, although the U.S. detonated the first thermonuke, the Soviets were first to weaponize.

Kissinger and the other critics have said Statement A greatly overstates the case. I believe the better argument is that the qualifying footnote’s assertion concerning design and weaponization is wrong. This can be shown by reference to open, unclassified sources.

In September of this year, the Iranians held a military parade at which a supposedly new missile called the Ghadr was put on display. Jane’s (paid subscription only) had an article about this “new” missile, which analysts said was actually a modified version of the Shahab-3 missile first seen in 2004. Here are some details from a December 2004 article in Jane’s Defense Weekly:

The missile has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device. Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation and visually appears similar to that used on the Russian SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. “It is not a copy of a known missile but the new Shahab has a major-league design. It’s clear that it is the work of seasoned missile engineers, probably Russian, rather than an experimental beginners ” version, added Rubin.

Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country’s first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests. The weapon is believed by US officials to be an indigenous design although knowledge gained from blueprints of a working, but too large nuclear weapon, provided by the Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan would be helpful to the effort. If true, the efforts would signify that IRAN is further advanced in its nuclear weapons programme than previously known.

According to the 2004 article, the program to develop the improved Shahab delivery system was called Ghadr-101. It is significant that the missile on display in 2007 is called the Ghadr. It suggests that what was seen in 2004 was a prototype and the 2007 version is the production model. Ironically, the missile in the parade had written on it, “Israel must be eliminated.”

Elsewhere on this blog, I’ve written about Iranian missile development. I’ve also said that the Iranians would almost certainly deploy 1 megaton thermonukes at the start – all it takes is 7 to obliterate Israel. Missile and warhead technology is probably the most difficult technology to master. The evidence is overwhelming that the Iranians have accomplished this. The biggest technological hurdle in building a uranium-based, first generation thermonuke is amassing enough highly enriched uranium. The Iranians have enrichment technology in hand – even the writers of the NIE acknowledge that Iran already has enough centrifuges to construct a U-235 weapon by 2009. This, too, is an overestimate - assuming that Iran installs no more centrifuges the date would be late 2008 – as I’ve shown in several previous blog entries, assuming only standard centrifuges, 3,000 will produce around 30 kg of highly enriched uranium (advanced centrifuges might produce close to twice this amount). Right now, the Iranians probably have a number of warheads waiting only for uranium, polonium-210, and tritium to turn them into weapons.

If the missile that will carry the thermonuke has been in a military parade open to the foreign press, why doesn’t the Intel bureaucracy know about it? John Bolton suggests that the writers of the NIE had a political motive. Possibly. However, I attribute it to the fact that bureaucracies are amplifiers of stupidity.

From their inception, the CIA and its siblings in civilian intelligence have demonstrated a remarkable inability to gather accurate information about our adversaries. The Soviets detonated their first A-bomb years ahead of the estimate provided by the Intel bureaucrats. The Intel bureaucrats were surprised again when the Soviets air dropped their first thermonuke – it was a double surprise because the Soviet thermonuke was fully weaponized, which briefly put the Soviets technically ahead of the U.S. Of course, most people know about the CIA-organized Bay of Pigs fiasco and there’s even a movie satirizing declassified information about the CIA’s laughable attempts to kill Castro. Most recently we have the missing stockpiles of WMD’s in Iraq. These are just a few examples off the top of my head – to properly catalogue the instances of CIA/Intel ineptitude over the past 60 years would require multiple volumes. Some historian really should undertake the task.

The evidence in the public domain that Iran is very close to having thermonukes and a way to put them on target is overwhelming. The fact that the Israeli government, which has access to classified information, has taken the unprecedented step of trying to convince the American government to repudiate the NIE’s conclusion should be considered dispositive.

At this critical time, the NIE has apparently so cowed George W. Bush that he has abandoned the Bush doctrine. We are now living in the worst of all possible worlds. The U.S. will not denuclearize Iran and, by sitting athwart the best attack routes, makes it nearly impossible for Israel to take action. If there is a nuke war in the Mid-East, what will be the consequence for the Intel agencies? The answer is: nothing. Actually, failure usually brings more funding – “if only we’d had more money we could have done a better job.” The stupidity of bureaucracies – especially government ones – is essentially limitless except for one area: self-preservation.

I’m back after a rather long hiatus. I spent the summer on involuntary vacation: I was laid off from my job at Crane. During my layoff I didn’t feel much like writing, though I did step up my exercise regimen and lost some weight. After I got a new position at Crane in September, I remained unmotivated. Yesterday, I came across an article in Jane’s – subscription through Crane – dealing with a subject I’ve previously discussed at length on this blog: whether or not Israel is capable of successfully launching a denuclearization attack on Iran. Quoting Jane’s: “While Israel’s rhetoric on this possibility is vigorous, the feasibility of such an operation is extremely low.”

Following are the main points in the Jane’s analysis:

• Natanz is roughly 1550 km from the nearest Israeli base.
• The 25 F-15I aircraft have an operational range of around 2000 km without drop tanks.
• The 102 F16I aircraft delivered and on order have a comparable range when fitted with conformal fuel tanks.
• The IAF has only 4 KC-707 and 3 KC-130 tankers available, which limits the ability of Israeli jets to loiter over the target(s).
• All routes to the target lead to countries not likely to allow over flights. Most probable would be along Iraqi-Saudi border, which increases the range by around 300 kilometers.
• For the above and other reasons, any attack is likely a “one-off” single wave of strike aircraft.
• Iranian air defense capability is limited but would still create operational challenges given the limited size of the Israeli strike and possible diversion of strike aircraft to defense.
• Somewhere from 50 to 100 penetrators could be put on target at Natanz, lack of intel about the buried facility may limit the damage.
• Since the Israeli strike would fly through airspace controlled and/or monitored by the U.S., Israeli-U.S. collusion would be assumed, generating all manner of adverse political “blowback”.

There is really nothing in the Jane’s analysis that I haven’t already discussed before. I am rather more sanguine about the direct route attack on Natanz (and Arak, which Jane’s didn’t mention) being successful than is Jane’s. Otherwise, I generally concur with the analysis, with a few minor quibbles. I’ll accept Jane’s tanker number. However, one possibility I’ve considered but not heretofore written about is that Israeli might use some number of its F-16A/B/C/D aircraft as tankers by fitting them with buddy packs. This could significantly ease the operational constraints and allow the Israelis to put more bombs on target.

I doubt that Israeli intel is problematic, as the Jane’s analysis suggests. Israeli intel is generally superb and, if a History Channel documentary aired a few days ago titled “Beyond Top Secret: Iran” is accurate, the Mossad actually tipped off the Iranian dissidents about where to look for the main Iranian nuclear facilities back in 2002. The History Channel documentary also discussed how Israel could achieve better results with its bunker busters: by double targeting. Because the bunker busters are so accurate, the first one blows a hole above the buried structure and the second goes into that hole and penetrates the structure before exploding. I didn’t discuss this possibility previously either, although I did discuss it with friends offline.

Everyone knows that only the U.S. can do a thorough job against Iran - the U.S. can not only take out the entire nuclear infrastructure but attrition the military and political infrastructure as well. What I’ve previously termed “active deterrence” requires that Iran’s military capabilities be severely degraded and Bush will have to act very soon. It will be too late to do anything if it’s left to the next President whomever he or she happens to be.

I generally try to avoid religious arguments unless provoked or moved by a need to correct a misconception. Thus, in Idiotic Design versus Theistic Evolution I addressed the popular misconception that Darwin’s Theory of evolution by natural selection is incompatible with belief in a creator deity. Now comes one Doug Giles who is both provocative and wrong in his column Hey, Atheists … Get your own moral code.

Giles’ article responds to critics of an earlier article he wrote (unread by me) in which he apparently asserted that non-believers are ipso facto immoral. In other words, he retailed the common misconception of religious folk that morality cannot exist without a deity. I touched on this topic briefly in my piece on an Israeli nuclear deterrence strategy I termed MAD with a vengeance. In discussing the “morality” of massive retaliation, I said, “A more useful (that is, scientific and objective) way of looking at morality is to say that it is evolved behavior in social animals that promotes survival.” I then talked about the idea of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) and offered Hillel’s formulation of the Golden Rule as an example of an ESS. The choice of the Golden Rule was deliberate since it is found in one form or another in every religious system on Earth.

The concluding paragraph in Giles’ article states his thesis:

So what’s it going to be, my obstreperous amigos? Are you going to continue to blather on about there being no God and then live like there is one and that His word and will matters? Get consistent, why don’t ‘cha? Don’t live by the Ten Commandments. Don’t live by the Golden Rule. Don’t do unto others as you would have them do unto you. That’s our stuff. That’s the Judeo-Christian way. Get your own commandments that are logically deduced from the “no God” hypothesis, write your own unholy book and form your own civilization. Then let’s see how appealing it is, how it betters the planet and how far you’ll get.

Giles seems to be almost completely unaware that the moral core of Christianity predates that particular religion or its lineal progenitor, Judaism. In fact, “moral” behavior can be observed not only in our Great Ape cousins but also in other intelligent social animals. Pre-scientific explanations for what humans see in nature – and themselves – have taken the form of magic or religion. Codifying natural “moral” behavior that humans were already exhibiting into a “religion” fits into this pattern.

Giles also makes the common mistake of confusing objectively defined moral or ethical behavior (such as the Golden Rule ESS) with idiomatic religious observance. Prohibitions against intra-group violence are ubiquitous among humans. In non-humans, intra-group mating contests tend to be highly ritualized and generally non-lethal. This is because too much intra-group violence and other “anti-social” behavior compromises group solidarity and the survival/breeding advantage it confers. So the prohibition against killing found in the Ten Commandments is an obvious manifestation of an evolutionarily established “moral” behavior. But what of the admonition against worshiping other gods in the First Commandment? This is feature of one of the earliest known monotheistic religions, Judaism, but makes no sense in the context of a polytheistic religion such as Hinduism. I suppose that a fundamentalist Christian can claim that Hindus are “immoral” but there is no objective basis for such a claim. Moreover, as is painfully obvious to non-Christians (especially Jews), the idea of a Trinity doesn’t comport with the idea of One God. It may be that this idea of multiple aspects of the One God is a doctrinal remnant of the syncretism by which early Christianity spread itself. Christianity, which originated as a Jewish heresy, was able to establish itself among pagan polytheists by adopting elements of their belief systems. Since many of these systems had multiple gods (for example, the Roman and Greek pantheon, the Nordic pantheon, etc.) it was functional to adopt some of those elements into Christianity. Judaism, in contrast, doesn’t proselytize and only spreads by maintaining a reasonably high birth rate within a tight community of believers. This explains many of the contradictions one finds in the Christian variants of Jewish observance, such as the Christian modification of the First Commandment. Given the very rapid spread of Christianity its early history, it is unsurprising to find the multiple deity components are most apparent in its oldest sect: Catholicism has all manner of demi-gods or “Saints” with semi-divine powers.

But, we need not dwell on Giles’ confusion about what constitutes moral behavior to see that his central argument is uninformed. Given that science adequately explains that moral behavior is evolved behavior, the fact is that it is believers – Christians included – and not atheists and agnostics, who are “borrowing” their moral code.

A little over a month ago, Iran announced it could enrich uranium on an “industrial scale”. In short order, IAEA inspectors were shown 8 cascades, amounting to 1,312 centrifuges, operating within the bowels of the subterranean Natanz enrichment facility. Yesterday, the New York Times reported, Atomic Agency Concludes Iran is Stepping Up Nuclear Work. The IAEA now says that Iran is installing a 164 centrifuge cascade each week and could have 8,000 operating by year’s end – assuming no increase in the installation rate. The most recent report states that the IAEA was able to sample the product stream and it was low enriched, reactor grade uranium – unsuitable for a bomb which, practically speaking, needs to be in the mid-to-high 90% range (20% is theoretically enough but totally impractical for military purposes). Still, 8,000 centrifuges – even low tech ones – can produce around 80 kilograms of weapons grade uranium a year, enough for several bombs.

The New York Times article mentions that Iran may be going for “breakout” capability. In the world of nuclear non-proliferation, breakout refers to the ability of a civilian nuclear program under full IAEA safeguards to rapidly transition to a military weapons program. Many signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) having no weapons program whatsoever can go to full scale weapons production in a few months should they choose to do so (for example, Belgium, Germany, and Japan fall into this category). Should Iran manage to get the U.S. and the international community to accept its “civilian” program – and under the NPT there is really no reason why they shouldn’t – then Iran could put Natanz under full IAEA safeguards until it has its 50,000 centrifuges operating. The speed with which the cascades could be reconfigured from low enriched uranium to weapons grade uranium is speculative but let’s say that it takes a month – it should almost certainly take much less time than this. Once reconfigured, the 50,000 centrifuges would output over 40 kilograms of weapons grade uranium a month. The Iranians could play all manner of games to prevent inspectors from monitoring their activities though their intent would be obvious. The amount of time for Iran to have enough material for its first bomb could be 6 weeks. Iran would have almost certainly prepared for this breakout so 6 weeks would be the time required to insert the uranium into the completed bomb and stick it on top of a ballistic missile.

Of course, Iran could prevent inspectors from accessing the product stream at any point and switch to a slow-motion breakout strategy that would give it several weapons early next year. At present, the strategic initiative rests solely with Iran. This became the case as soon as Iran was allowed to spin up its centrifuges with impunity.

Over the lifetime of this blog and before, going back to late 2002 or early 2003, I have written that the Bush Doctrine called for neutralizing terrorist states with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Neutralizing means either changing the government or removing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons – or both.

As the Bush administration has had to adjust to changing political fortunes, both at home and abroad, it has appeared to lose focus on the goals of the Bush Doctrine. The reasons for the administration’s political difficulties are as manifold as they are obvious, for example: the immediate failure to find “stockpiles” of poison gas in Iraq, the rise of sectarian violence in postwar Iraq, the paralysis of the Iraqi government, and so on. These and other problems – such as the President’s deficient communication skills - have made it difficult for Bush to change the subject to Iran.

The success or failure of the Bush Doctrine hinges on Iran and the range of options available to the administration has been significantly reduced over the past two years. Congress is never going to authorize the sort of open ended authority it gave the President for dealing with Iraq – authority that amounted to a declaration of war. The only option remaining is for the President to use his authority as Commander in Chief to launch an aerial campaign designed to eliminate the nuclear threat and, perhaps, to attrition the Iranian military in the process. Most Democrats in Congress would welcome such a campaign as would Sunni Arab states and most, if not all, of the member states of the European Union. None are willing to support it publicly – “let Bush do it and take the heat” seems to be the consensus view.

Can “Bush do it” without Congressional approval? The short answer is, “yes”. In Libertarians! Embrace your inner Republican!, I said that Jefferson’s undeclared war against the Barbary Pirates was based upon Article II powers given to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Presidential candidate Senator Joe Biden has said that the President may launch preemptive strikes to defend U.S. forces from attacks originating in or supported by Iran. Even if some members of Congress want to oppose the President, under the War Powers Act, the President can commit troops for 60 days before Congress can force a withdrawal. The focus of the War Powers Act seems to be ground troops – boots on the ground – and an air campaign, even with SpecOps, probably wouldn’t activate its provisions (even if it does, there would be plenty of room for legalistic wrangling that could take months to resolve).

Assuming that Bush still intends to destroy Iran’s nuclear program before it fabricates its first nuke, the question is, when? Since Bush & Co. didn’t attack before the first centrifuge spun inside the hardened facility, it means that some threshold number of centrifuges must exist before military action will be sanctioned. At 50,000 centrifuges, Iran could easily produce its first bomb between inspections, such would be the production rate. Irrespective of the breakout problem, allowing Iran to install all 50,000 would so undermine the U.S. position as to make it unlikely that the U.S. would do anything to prevent Iran from going nuclear. The threshold mu