The Hoosier Gadfly

I just came across this article by geologist Jeffrey Park in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Park says that the seismic data indicate the latest North Korean test was another fizzle, concluding the yield was “likely 4 kilotons or smaller”.

According to the author bio in the sidebar, Park seems to be qualified to opine knowledgably on the seismic data. In my previous post, I cited a Guardian article. I failed to note that article relied exclusively on a Russian source for estimates of the device’s yield. Recall that after the 2006 test, the Russians’ estimates were way above everyone else’s, calling into question the accuracy of their seismic data and/or their analysis.

If Park is right it tends to support my view that the North Koreans produced a batch of plutonium contaminated with too much Pu-240. This, I think, is the best explanation of the documented low yield back in 2006 and the (possible) low yield last month. North Korean technology is just too primitive to solve the problem they doubtless created when they tried to increase the reactor’s plutonium output through a higher burnup. Higher burnup translates into a higher percentage of Pu-240.

For now, I’ll wait to pass judgment on the success of the North Korean test until there is some agreement on the seismic data, though I’m inclined to accept Park’s estimate of 2 to 4 kilotons.

Back in October 2006, I speculated (accurately) that North Korea’s nuke test was a “fizzle”. Yesterday, North Korea (aka the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea – DPRK) conducted another test, this time achieving a yield of aproximately 20 kilotons. As I said in the 2006 article:

North Korea has repeatedly shown itself to be technologically backward – for example, after eight years of trying, it remains unable to launch an ICBM. Arguably, 60-year-old nuclear technology is nearly as challenging as 50-year-old rocket technology. Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that North Korea would attempt anything more advanced than a 1^st generation plutonium bomb along the lines of the “Fat Man” that was first tested by the U.S. in July 1945. A 1^st generation device should have a nominal yield of around 20 kilotons – hence, the “dud” speculation.

It appears that North Korea has finally gotten it right.

There are no real details at this point. If we assume that the North Koreans are still relying on their existing plutonium stockpile, they’ve obviously figured out how to get around the Pu-240 problem. Even so, given the torturously slow pace of their technological advance (they still haven’t managed to successfully launch an ICBM), North Korea isn’t likely to become a threat to the U.S. for some years.

The U.S. perhaps can afford to be complacent. Japan, which is in North Korean missile range, cannot. The Japanese have “breakout” capability that would give them deliverable thermonukes in a year or so. All that is required is the exercise of political will to make it happen. Along with the SM-3 ship-launched ABM acquired from the U.S., which is carried by their home grown Aegis DDG’s, Japan has a credible missile defense. In light of the Korea’s experience with the Japan in the first half of the 20^th century, Kim Jong-Il should be loath to provoke the Japanese into arming themselves with thermonukes. Yet, that is precisely what is going to happen if the diminutive dictator continues on his present course.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a study 14 March 2009 laying out an Israeli attack scenario against Iranian nuclear sites. It is very similar to my Scenario 1 from 12 February 2007, which describes a direct strike on the key Iranian nuke sites.

There are some differences between the CSIS and my scenario. Before I get into those, I’ll note several instances where the CSIS study either confuses aircraft types or numbers of aircraft. I’m doing this in order to avoid passing the confusion on to possible readers.

Throughout the CSIS study, the F-15I “Thunder” is consistently referred to as F-15E. The F-15I is essentially an F-15E with Israeli modified electronics and avionics. In fact, the CSIS study correctly shows the Israelis with 25 F-15I’s and no F-15E’s on page 54. Accordingly, I’ll assume that when the CSIS study refers to F-15E’s it really means F-15I’s. The study also states that the Israelis have 4 “B-700” tankers (p. 71). According to the sources I consulted when I put together Scenario 1, Israel had 5 KC-130H and 5 KC-707 tankers. Later that year, Jane’s gave 3 KC 130H and 4 KC-707 tankers. Global Security now also gives 4 KC-707 tankers. I therefore assume that the one reference to the B-700 really means KC-707 and is either a typo or referring to a generic Boeing aircraft in the 700 series.

There is also a bit of confusion with respect to the tanker inventory. In the mission force allocation (p. 70), the target packages require a total of 12 “KC-130” tankers. Israel has no more than 5 KC-130H’s. If for some reason the analysis is using the KC-130H as a reference tanker, it would mean that several KC-130H’s would be replaced by one KC-707 in an actual mission. It would have been helpful if this had been called out in the CSIS study.

One key difference between the CSIS study and my scenario is that CSIS posits the F-15I’s have been modified to carry two 2100kg BLU-113 bunker busters (see p.45) instead of one. Carrying only one in my scenario meant that all 25 of the F-15I’s (24 F-15I’s + 1 spare/backup) plus 22 F-16’s carrying the smaller BLU-109’s were needed to take out the two Natanz enrichment buildings. (Note that in a later posting I stated I wasn’t sure if the BLU-109 could penetrate into the building proper without “double targeting”. Double targeting entails using the first bomb to blow a crater and the second to follow immediately behind and penetrate the rest of the way.) By carrying two BLU-113’s, the CSIS study concludes that 25 F-15’s alone would be sufficient to take out the Natanz facility and might include double targeting (p. 37).

The CSIS study also adds the UF₆ plant at Esfahan to the reference strike (p. 70). The CSIS study does mention the possibility of using “Buddy Refueling” to provide extra tanker capacity (p. 71), a topic I have previously discussed. (Note that the possible use of buddy refueling may also explain the 12 KC-130 tankers listed on page 70. Several F-16’s with buddy packs would equal one KC-130H.) The total number of aircraft used for 3 targets (Natanz, Arak, and Esfahan) in the CSIS study is 89 (80 combat plus 9 tankers). My strike gave 145 (133 combat plus 2 jammers and 10 tankers) for 2 targets (Natanz and Arak). Assuming only 25 F-15I’s are needed for Natanz, this would reduce the overall numbers in my direct attack scenario to 120. This is not a huge disagreement and reflects my conservative approach.

I agree with CSIS that the use of conventional ballistic missile and cruise missile assets by Israel should be contemplated, even though I didn’t include them in my Scenario 1.

The CSIS study provides considerable background on enrichment, centrifuge technology, and Separative Work Units – topics I have also addressed on this blog - and has come to similar conclusions about Iranian bomb making capabilities. For example, we both calculate that at full capacity, Natanz will produce at least 500 kg/yr of weapons grade, high enriched uranium (HEU) resulting in a couple of dozen or so weapons. The table on page 109 showing Separative Work requirements for different starting enrichments illustrates the non-linear relationship between Separative Work and enrichment level. Unfortunately, because there is no analysis of its significance, the import of this information is easy to miss. I discussed the strategic ramifications of the Iranian low enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile in some depth in my last posting.

CSIS did not consider a no flyover scenario, although I did. Instead, CSIS assumed one of three more or less direct routes – their “central route” over Jordan and Iraq being my Scenario 1. CSIS analyzed both the political and operational costs of the three routes and concluded a northern route over Syria and southern Turkey was optimal. I considered and rejected this route figuring that operational considerations outweighed every other once violation of neutral airspace was settled upon. This is not to say that CSIS was wrong to select this route. If Israel has an understanding with the Turks, the northern route would become preferable.

A possible clue to Israeli attack plans is to examine what is currently being discussed in the Israeli media. Haaretz, no friend of either Likud or PM Benjamin Netanyahu, editorialized about an impending attack and the political groundwork being laid for it by Netanyahu. This, according to Haaretz, is the principle purpose of Netanyahu’s upcoming trip to the US:

Israel will find it difficult to attack Iran alone without a ‘green light’ from America, even if it is only implied and if America ostensibly turns a blind eye. But once the moment of truth arrives, it is doubtful Obama would give the order to take down the Israeli planes heading to Iran - or for that matter to declare an end of aid to Israel or to sever relations. Obviously, the U.S. will want to remain somewhat distanced from any operation that is launched, so as not to be vulnerable to the anticipated Iranian response. But its strong commitment to Israeli security will not allow America to forcibly prevent a military operation designed to prevent a second Holocaust. That is the message Netanyahu will try to implant in the minds of the members of Congress.

I consider it very significant that the possibility Obama might give a “take down” or shoot down order is being seriously discussed in Israel and in the Israeli newspaper that is arguably the friendliest to the new administration. (This is a subject I discussed back in 31 October 2008, just before the election.) Netanyahu is wise to marshal as much political support in Congress as possible to elevate the political cost to the Obama administration of any attempt to “forcibly prevent” an Israeli attack.

An Obama-ordered shoot down would only be politically viable if the Israeli attack overflew Iraqi territory. It is worth considering that Netanyahu is deliberately misleading both the Obama administration and Iran as to the axis of the attack. If the assumption being made by all parties is that the attack is the CSIS “central route” (my direct attack), whereas the real attack follows a different route, this will enhance surprise when the attack is actually launched.

Given the monetary and personnel resources available to CSIS relative to my own, I’m pleased our conclusions were so close. (If anyone from CSIS happens on my site, contact me. For a suitable salary increase I’d be happy to work for you folks.)

Since my last posting in January, the political situation in Israel has clarified: 2^nd place finisher Likud and party leader Benjamin Netanyahu are now in charge. There have been some other changes as well. True to Obama’s campaign statements indicating he intended to limit/reduce/eliminate US ballistic missile defense programs, his administration is planning to eliminate US involvement in the joint US-Israeli Arrow 3 program, freeze U.S. land-based ABM deployment, and halt development of the Airborne Laser system, effectively killing it. In and of themselves, these decisions don’t affect the probable Israeli attack timetable because the ABM systems at issue would likely be deployed sometime after Iran crossed the nuclear threshold. I mention the Obama administration’s policy on ballistic missile defense here only because I may want to address it in a future post. The whole issue becomes somewhat less urgent if Israel defangs Iran. When we might expect the defanging to occur is the topic I’m going to discuss in the balance of this article.

In some of my earliest posts, I stated that Iran conceivably could have its first nuke (a one megaton thermonuke) in late 2007. As we know, that did not happen chiefly because the schedule for the expansion of the Natanz facility has “slipped to the right”. Recall that in Is there a “threshold”?, written 16 May 2007, I gave 6,000 to 8,000 as the largest number of operating centrifuges that would be tolerated before preemption became a necessity. I further stated that I would choose the lower number if it were my decision. I concluded by saying, “If the U.S. doesn’t attack by that point, it’s not going to attack. That’s when Israel will step up to the plate if it hasn’t already done so.”

We now have good information from a variety of sources that Iran will have 6,000 centrifuges installed and running by this summer and, most importantly, that Iran had, at the end of last year, produced enough U-235 at a 3.8% enrichment level to make at least one bomb. This latter fact is significant for reasons the popular media and the Obama administration have neglected to discuss.

To understand, let’s make use of this handy-dandy Separative Work Calculator from Urenco, the large uranium enrichment company based in Europe.

Using a neutron reflector (like beryllium) along with implosion, a much smaller amount of U-235 is needed for a critical mass than with a gun design and no neutron reflector. This is less than 20 kg, at high enrichment levels. At least this amount is known to be present in the uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) “product” that Iran has stockpiled. Note that 3.8% U-235 cannot be fashioned into a bomb - at least 20% U-235 is needed. For practical reasons the enrichment level for “weapons grade” uranium is normally in the 90% range.

Iran has been enriching uranium for a couple of years to get to this point, adding centrifuge capacity as it has gone along. One might be inclined to believe that there is still a large margin of safety based upon the assumption that, since it took this long to get to 3.8%, it must require a significant amount of additional time/effort to get to 90%+. It doesn’t work that way – the relationship is logarithmic, not linear. To illustrate, let’s go to the calculator.

First a caveat: I’m not a weaponeer so I don’t know the exact amounts of U-235 that would be needed for a 1 megaton thermonuke (see here, which includes my argument why Iran will go directly to a one megaton device). I do know that, in addition to the U-235 for the trigger, there would also be U-235 needed to initiate the fusion reaction in the lithium-6 deuteride. I’m going to use 30 kg of 95% enriched U-235 as a good ballpark value for the total required.

The units in the calculator are metric tonnes (1,000 kg = 1 metric tonne), so we enter the values accordingly. For “Feed Assay” enter 0.711 (the percentage of U-235 in natural uranium); for “Product Assay” enter 95; for tails enter 0.3; for product enter 0.03 (30 kg = 0.03 metric tonnes). Hit the “Calculate” button. You get 6.14424 tSW. We could also express this as 6144.24 kg SW. The “Feed” is 6.91241 tonnes of natural uranium (the box immediately below is the amount of UF₆ gas). Now, clear out the entries. For “Feed Assay” enter 0.711 again; for “Product Assay” enter 3.8; for tails enter 0.3. This time, enter the 6.91241 we got above in the “Feed” box for tU. Hit the “Calculate” button. We get 3.97689 tSW. (Incidentally, if you want to check this with another calculator, you can plug the appropriate values into the FAS Separative Work Calculator – the results will be the same to 4 decimal places).

What does all of this mean? To get from natural uranium to 95% enriched, bomb grade uranium (known as high enriched uranium – HEU) takes 6.14424 tSW. To take the same amount of natural uranium to 3.8% enrichment (known as low enriched uranium – LEU) requires 3.97689 tSW. Most of the work (around 64%) expended is to get from 0.711% to 3.8%. With 6,000 or so centrifuges running at max efficiency, it should take only a few weeks to go from 3.8% to 95%.

As I write this, Iran’s “public” nuclear program is subject to IAEA monitoring. So long as the centrifuge operation and LEU UF₆ stockpile are compliant with IAEA safeguards, there is no “immediate” threat, or so the argument against preemption goes. Militating against this is the speed with which the first bomb can be produced – a few weeks if the Natanz facility is converted to bomb making. A few weeks would still offer time to issue an ultimatum and then attack. However, as Iranian enrichment capacity increases, along with the stock of LEU, the Israeli reaction time decreases. This is the basic calculus behind my original threshold argument. Israel cannot put itself into a position where it has little time and no margin for error when it attacks. Added to this problem is that if Iran has a small clandestine facility somewhere, it could begin to divert the LEU and initiate bomb production. It would be suicidal folly for the Israeli government to depend on the competence of the IAEA to catch Iranian diversion. No doubt Israel relies heavily on human intelligence (humint) on the Iranian program gathered by the Mossad – the best intel agency in the world. Still, the difficulty of monitoring what the Iranians are doing, even throwing in spy satellite sweeps, increases exponentially as the Iranian program expands.

It is the inexorable mathematics of Separative Work and the enrichment process that is driving Israeli planning now. Doubtless, the Israeli attack plan is fully developed and could be set in motion in 24 hours or less. The Israelis must immediately respond to any LEU diversion they detect, irrespective of what the IAEA or international community may say. As stated above, because of the reduced amount of Separative Work required to produce a bomb from the LEU, small, widely dispersed cascades that have thus far gone undetected could readily complete the process.

The lower limit of the threshold will be reached in at most a couple of months. Based upon this, my prediction is that Israel will attack some time this summer at the latest. Israel could potentially delay a short period beyond that, with an emphasis on the word “short”. The larger the stockpile grows, even if the number of centrifuges added at Natanz is halted, the bigger the problem for Israel.

The optimal time to attack in order to maximize the Israeli advantages is 48 hours either side of New Moon at 0200 local. The months of June through September are most likely with the odds of an Israeli preempt increasing through the summer.

Though I expect a night attack, I wouldn’t rule out a daylight strike. In fact, if I were the head of the IDF, I’d strongly advise it. One of the most important resources available to the Iranians is the experience their engineers and technicians have gained over the years the nuclear program has been in operation. It is, therefore, an unfortunate necessity to kill as many of these people as possible. A daylight attack will find the maximum number of engineers and technicians at work. In addition to the enrichment facility at Natanz and the heavy water plant at Arak (see Scenario 1), cruise missiles, possibly augmented by SpecOps, should hit research centers where scientists would be located. Like the Allied raid against the Peenemunde V-2 facility in 1943 which sought to kill von Braun and his team of rocket scientists, the Iranian nuclear scientists are prime targets.

The Israelis have shown remarkable restraint throughout their history, so I doubt they will choose my approach. But, be assured, attack they will.

On 10 January, the New York Times posted U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site, which claims that the U.S. refused to supply Israel with advanced bunker busters, refueling aircraft, or to allow overflights of Iraq for an attack on Iran. Nothing in this article should surprise readers of this blog. In Playing Chicken: how Iran might win a nuclear war back in September 2005, I said that U.S. sale of bunker busters and specialized, long-range aircraft (the F-16I and F-15I) to Israel were part of a U.S. bluff:

[T]he Iranians could reasonably expect that the U.S. would keep Israel in check – in other words, if the U.S. doesn’t act, Israel probably won’t either. The U.S. is obviously playing its version of the game: the sale of equipment to Israel that would be needed for preemption (for example, bunker busters) is rather like throwing the steering wheel out of the car window. “We have no control over the Israelis, and they’ve demonstrated in the past they will preempt,” is the message we’re trying to send. The Iranians – rightly in my opinion – believe this is a bluff.

No U.S. administration was or is going to actively cooperate with Israel in attacking Iran. That’s one of the main reasons I figured that the U.S. had to carry out the attack.

In my first Israeli attack scenario, I analyzed an Israeli attack taking the direct route over Iraq. This scenario was predicated on the U.S. not taking active steps to prevent an overflight – that is, shoot down Israeli aircraft. I said that the Israelis would only inform the U.S. once the attack was underway. Nearly all of the risk in this operation is tied to uncertainties about possible U.S reactions, principally political but some military risks as well. The second scenario posited an attack that stays in international airspace until crossing the Iraqi border. The distance involved is so great and tanker aircraft so limited that only the Natanz site could be hit by a small force. Even if this attack were effective, it would leave the Arak heavy water and plutonium production facilities untouched. The fact that the political cost for Israel is nearly as great as scenario 1, coupled with the limited objectives and tight margins of scenario 2, make it unlikely to be chosen, in my view.

I maintain that if Netanyahu and Likud win, the odds are good that Israel will attack, probably by the direct route though a slightly longer route over Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States can’t be ruled out. Over the weekend, I had an opportunity to put my money where my mouth is – a buddy offered to bet me that Israel would not attack. I wasn’t confident enough to take the bet. For one thing, although Likud probably will win it isn’t a certainty and, were Likud to lose, I’m not particularly confident that the Kadima government will buck the U.S. and attack. (I’ll still stick with the prediction I made on this blog.) I was, however, willing to offer another bet: if the principal Iranian nuclear facilities are not attacked, there will be a nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran before the end of 2012.

I’ve been consistent in my analysis that Iran is either not deterrable or will be too aggressive, making it likely Iran will blunder into a nuke war. There is a third possibility I’ve long considered though haven’t heretofore discussed: a nuclear Iran may undergo a political upheaval or revolution and launch its nukes in a final, convulsive Götterdämmerung. Back in March 2005 in Preemptive war against Iran, I said:

From the perspective of the mullahs, Western culture is a mortal threat. Against the freedom, affluence, and vitality of the West, the mullahs can only offer a decadent medievalism that was on the way out 500 years ago. The mullahs realize that without nukes, Iran will be unable to maintain its closed society and the theocracy will collapse of its own weight.

If Iran can be deprived of nukes and otherwise contained, the theocracy will collapse. But what happens if Iran gets its nukes and then the inevitable collapse occurs? The Mullahs are never going to step down peacefully – the theocracy’s janissaries, the fanatical Revolutionary Guard, will fight to the last man. The Revolutionary Guard will also control the Iranian nuclear arsenal when it comes into existence because only the Guard will be deemed politically reliable. It is naïve to believe that, as their last act, the keepers of the nuclear fire will not unleash it on the infidels.

Will Israel’s new Arrow 3, the U.S. Navy’s SM-3, and the Air Force’s Airborne Laser anti-ballistic missile systems be able to shoot down an Iranian strike? The potential effectiveness of the various ABM systems must figure in the Iranian strategic calculus when planning its attack. Talking all of the political, theological, economic, and technological factors into account, I give the odds of a nuclear exchange before 1 January 2013 as 50-50.

Israel is now several days in to a major operation intended to attrition Hamas and degrade its ability to launch indiscriminate rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. In November, just before Obama won, I predicted that the Kadima-led Israeli government would launch an attack on Iran in the month before the February 10 parliamentary elections. I argued that this ”January Surprise” would, among other things, help Kadima and party leader Tzipi Livni against the favored Likud Party and Benjamin Netanyahu. Given the timing of the attack on Hamas, has it taken the place of a January attack on Iran? My answer: probably.

Since I made my prediction, Obama has selected a foreign policy team which is much better than any I (or probably anyone else) could have anticipated. By retaining Robert Gates as Defense Secretary and putting Hillary Clinton at the head of the State Department, we can dismiss my postulated worst case foreign policy scenario from further consideration. With few exceptions, pragmatists will be running U.S. foreign policy in the Obama administration, which ironically means that Obama’s first term really will be something like a Bush third.

From the Israeli perspective, U.S. foreign policy isn’t going to change that much, though that is not necessarily an appealing prospect. As I wrote back in January, 2007, “With Gates in the administration, everyone surrounding Bush now appears to be counseling that the only option in dealing with Iran is diplomatic because the military option isn’t feasible…”. The Obama administration is not going to be hostile to Israel but it is also not likely to do anything to denuclearize Iran. In fact, there are indications that the Obama administration will adopt a policy first articulated by Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primary campaign.

According to a report in Haaretz, the U.S. will propose to extend its nuclear umbrella over Israel and massively retaliate in the event of an Iranian nuclear attack. Such a policy would only be contemplated if the standard deterrent theory view has prevailed: that Iran is deterrable. The Haaretz article agrees:

But America’s nuclear guarantee to Israel could also be interpreted as a sign the U.S. believes Iran will eventually acquire nuclear arms. Secretary of state-designate Hillary Clinton had raised the idea of a nuclear guarantee to Israel during her campaign for the Democratic Party’s nomination for the presidency. During a debate with Obama in April, Clinton said that Israel and Arab countries must be given “deterrent backing.” She added, “Iran must know that an attack on Israel will draw a massive response.

Actually, Hillary’s exact words were that the U.S. would to “obliterate Iran”. That statement, though bracing at the time, was and remains strategically wrongheaded. As I’ve previously discussed, a nuclear Iran will either attack Israel out of religious zealotry or, more likely, provoke a nuclear exchange through hyperaggressiveness. Even if a war with Israel is somehow avoided, Iran will merely shift its attention to its ultimate adversary: the U.S. It will develop ICBM’s and play chicken some time in Obama’s second term.

Whether or not the U.S. deterrent strategy is valid (see, for example, my counterargument to preempting against Iran), it is unlikely that it will ever be acceptable to Israel. To quote a famous U.S. politician: “[I]f you’ve gone through the Holocaust, then that does not offer the same sense of confidence and security as the idea that the Jewish people can take care of themselves no matter what happens.” The famous U.S. politician was Barack Obama. He offered this insight during the primary campaign.

Israel developed an independent nuclear deterrent precisely because history has shown that Jews can ultimately only depend on themselves for defense. Obama’s statement suggested that he understood this. Why then would his administration float the idea that the Israelis should become totally dependent on the U.S. deterrent? I prefer not to speculate.

What is obvious is the U.S. is not going to attack. Therefore, Israel must. The absolute last chance for Israel to denuclearize Iran is this year. The only question remaining is when. The answer is, sometime after the general election and the formation of a new government. The “January Surprise” attack on Iran is not going to happen. The reason for this is purely political, not military.

The Israeli Air Force has ample resources to carry out the reference strike on Iran even as it conducts operations in Gaza. The aircraft that would be used in the Iran strike are special purpose and are almost certainly not being used in the Gaza operation. In fact, the Gaza operation could provide a degree of operational cover: no one is going to expect Israel to launch an air strike on Iran in the midst of a major operation by the IDF in Gaza.

The only resource that Israel has in short supply is political credit. The U.S. is the lone support for Israel’s Gaza campaign. If U.S.-Israeli relations are going to be strained by an Israeli attack on Iran, it is best that this happen after the Gaza campaign is over and U.S. support is less critical. Right or wrong, I expect this is the thinking of the current government.

So, Gaza is the January Surprise. Politically, it’s at best a damp squib.

My final prediction: Likud will emerge from the 10 February elections as the leading vote getter and Benjamin Netanyahu will form a government. Shortly thereafter, Israel will attack Iran.

Having covered the low probability worst case scenarios for an Obama administration, I now want to make some general observations about the most likely course for President-Elect Obama and Congressional Democrats. Previously, I said:

Obama’s true genius is in self-promotion and the acquisition of power. He is exactly the sort of person the Framers had in mind when they put so many checks and balances into the Constitution. Today, most of those checks – those negative feedbacks – have been eliminated. Obama will have more scope for a malign ambition that any President in U.S. history.

I stand by that statement. However, the fact that a President wields more power than ever before doesn’t mean Obama has been given a carte blanche.

Some of the checks and balances still exist: Congress retains a huge amount of power but it is rooted in regional, state, and demographic constituencies. Those constituencies didn’t suddenly change in 2006, when the Democrats took control of both houses of Congress. Many of the Republicans unseated in 2006 and this year were replaced with centrists or with conservative “Blue Dog” Democrats. In the House especially, party discipline carries only so far with such individuals – they ultimately have to answer to the voters in their respective Districts. Can the Blue Dogs be stampeded into supporting a radical agenda? Sure, as I’ve suggested in my worst case scenarios. If the economic situation worsens it can be exploited by the left-wing Democratic leadership. Crisis always creates a bias in favor of expanded government power. Absent a complete collapse, however, the Democratic centrists are going to be hesitant to sign on to sweeping changes their constituents aren’t going to like. As a number of analyses show (see, for example, A sweeping rejection of President Bush by David Boaz of the Cato Institute), the electoral center that Obama won voted for more fiscal responsibility and less foreign interventionism – not a “New ‘New Deal’”. Expect Obama’s ambitions, whether malign or not, to be significantly thwarted by members of his own party.

Aside from the lack of ideological purity within the ruling Democratic Party there is a second potential impediment to radical change: the permanent federal bureaucracy.

Back in the good old days, the federal bureaucracy was tiny and largely comprised of members of the victorious party. When the party took power, it rewarded party stalwarts with positions in the government. This system was called the patronage or “spoils” system. All this eventually changed after the assassination of James A Garfield when his successor, Chester A. Arthur, and Congress established the merit-based, non-partisan Civil Service. My view is this was a disaster for the Republic (here is a good, libertarian-oriented historical overview of how the civil service came to be) because the bureaucracy, though nominally part of the Executive Branch, promulgates regulations having the force of law, thus operating as its own Legislative Branch. Over time the various components of the federal bureaucracy have become primarily devoted to self-preservation and “rent seeking”. Today, the U.S. Government really is the unelected bureaucracy.

Ironically, although the permanent bureaucracy is a threat to freedom and antithetical to the whole idea of limited government, it can act as a check on the unbridled exercise of power by a President. A new President is going to be viewed as a caretaker – he or she is going to be around at most 8 years. High level bureaucrats are people who have been members of the organization for most if not all of their professional lives, which will have encompassed several administrations. They have no allegiance to the new President even if they generally share the President’s ideology. First and foremost, their allegiance is to the bureaucracy itself.

President Obama can and will appoint radicals to head key agencies. For example, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr’s name as been bruited about as a possible EPA head. RFK Jr. is to Environmentalism as Torquemada was to Catholicism. Even with someone like RKF Jr. in charge, the EPA will remain composed of various factions that consume a considerable amount of energy in political infighting. Attending this will be all manner of systemic inefficiencies that have developed over a period of decades. The result is a level of organizational inertia that will resist any attempt to rapidly change direction or focus. Assuming he is a skilled administrator and remains as EPA head long enough, RFK Jr. could eventually get the agency to become more radical but even he is still unlikely to turn it into the office of the Grand Environmental Inquisitor, much as he might like to.

Obama will depend on the bureaucracies in the Executive Branch to implement as best they can the policies he and Congress cook up. Federal agencies are probably the least efficient of any bureaucracy so their best is going to be pretty bad. Implementation will be haphazard and schedules will “move to the right”.

A final consideration is that the Obama administration will eventually offend one or more high level bureaucratic factions at some point. In Deep Throat revealed – and what it reveals, I said of “Deep Throat” (W. Mark Felt), “Hell hath no fury like a bureaucrat scorned.” At a minimum, bureaucrats who develop enmity toward the Obama administration will leak information intended to damage it and the President. Perhaps the Obama people will be able to minimize the political and PR sequelae. The press will also tend to protect him. However, old patterns will eventually assert themselves – the press simply can’t pass up a good story, whether true or not - and Obama will find his policies and competence questioned. Keeping his approval numbers high will tend constrain his worst impulses and he will be forced to be more centrist than he ever intended.

There is ample evidence that the Israeli government and Israelis in general believe that an Obama administration will be much more inclined toward Israel’s enemies than any previous U.S. administration. There is also ample evidence that the Israeli government and the Bush administration have major disagreements over the imminence of the Iranian threat. If a Bush administration would react unfavorably to an Israeli preempt, how is a distinctly unfriendly (to Israel) Obama administration going to react? As I discussed in my previous article it is not unthinkable that the Obama administration would threaten to actively prevent an Israeli attack on Iran that would interfere with direct U.S.-Iran peace talks.

The Israeli planners will likely assign a low probability to an actively hostile U.S. administration – it is a “worst case” after all. Even without a worst case scenario, the Israelis are very close to the “drop dead date” for preemption. Rather than deal with the uncertainties of an Obama administration, the prudent course is to attack before the Obama administration can establish new policies and communicate them to the Israelis. The Israelis can therefore be expected to follow the old adage that it is better to ask forgiveness than seek permission.

There is another very important factor that would exist even if John McCain were elected: the Israeli parliamentary elections are going to be held in early February. The Kadima Party, now headed by Tzipi Livni, faces repudiation by the voters – the Likud Party, headed by former PM Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to pick up a large number of seats in the Knesset. Moreover, Kadima is a fusion party. Though most of its members were formerly with Likud, many prominent former members of Labor also joined the Party. Kadima is very much a creature of Ariel Sharon, who created the Party after he left Likud, and now that he is out of the picture there is a legitimate question as to whether or not Kadima can remain intact. Benjamin Netanyahu has made it very clear that if he and Likud head the government, there will be no “Second Holocaust” from an Iranian nuclear attack. Livni and Kadima are perceived as more dovish, relatively speaking. This would be a problem apart from the corruption of former Kadima head Ehud Omert, which forced his resignation and is the proximate cause of the early elections.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Israel will attack before the February elections. The only question that remains is when. There are two options: during the lame-duck term of George W. Bush or at the beginning of Barack Obama’s term.

Bush is very well liked in Israel and is widely viewed as a friend. There is still a remote possibility that Bush will launch air strikes so the Israelis will probably give him at least through November. Assuming, as I do, that there is still some flex in the Israeli attack schedule, I am guessing that the Israelis won’t attack while Bush is still President. That moves D-Day to early in the Obama Presidency. For domestic political purposes, a few weeks before the February elections – sometime in late January – would be optimal once it has been decided to attack. Think of it as being the Israeli political equivalent of the American “October Surprise”.

The temptation for a Kadima-led government to attack in January would exist if McCain were elected but I don’t believe it would be acted upon. McCain is known and respected – Israelis trust that he will take action against Iran or, at least, will not prevent the Israelis from doing so.

So, I am formally predicting that Israel will launch a preemptive attack on Iran that takes the most expeditious route – that is, the attack will go through Iraqi airspace. It will take place in the latter part of January, while the Obama administration is organizing itself. Were I planning the Israeli strike, in order to eliminate any worst case scenario in which the Obama administration interferes with it, I’d launch the attack so that the first wave crosses over into Iraqi airspace at 17:01 GMT on 20 January. This would be at the same time Obama is taking his Oath of Office. No one in the U.S. government will be in a position to react to this “crisis” and the Israelis can expect no interference from U.S. force.

Obama is going to be very displeased that his peace plans for the Mideast are dashed – he’ll be personally affronted if the Israelis attack during his Inauguration, thus sending the message that they don’t trust him. It doesn’t really matter because Obama is going to be drug, kicking and screaming, into fighting a war with Iran in the Persian Gulf. The ironic aspect is that the vast military apparatus he will head will be able to kick major butt – Obama may well come out of a U.S.-Iran military engagement with enhanced stature because he will have been forced into doing the right thing.

It is four days before the general election and an Obama victory appears all but certain. One issue that has arisen over the past few days derives from comments by running mate Joe Biden that were taped at a private event. Biden said that Obama would be “tested” by some sort of foreign crisis within the first 6 months of his administration and suggested that his way of dealing with it might not be understood or popular initially. He called on followers to stick with Obama when that happened. Because Biden is wont to deliver all manner of non sequiturs when speaking, perhaps his statement isn’t worth serious consideration. However, since Biden was so pointed as to the time frame and even the public reaction, inquiring as to what he might have in mind is appropriate. The McCain-Palin campaign certainly thinks so, judging from an ad that has appeared using audio clips of Biden’s statements.

Commentators who have speculated on what the crisis might be have included the Mideast and Iran as possibilities but none has considered this as anything other than some sort of challenge from Iran. I think there is an obvious possibility that everyone is missing. Before I get to that, let me offer some background.

I’ve written extensively about the Iranian nuclear program and possible actions the U.S. or Israel might take to deal with it. Readers are encouraged to search this blog, which delves into possibilities few have discussed or that weren’t being discussed at the time I posted the article. One early article in the latter category argued that the U.S. would strongly resist any attempt by the Israelis to launch their own preemptive attack.

In Throwing out the steering wheel I said:

There is no way that an Israeli attack can take place without the U.S. condoning it. Israeli aircraft would have to pass through airspace controlled by the U.S. Thus, the universal view in the Islamic world will be that the Israelis are acting as henchmen for the U.S. – doing America’s dirty work. Since this would be a political disaster of epic proportions, I have always assumed that the U.S. would never permit it to take place – that, in fact, the U.S. will attack.

[Emphasis added.] (Note also that I later analyzed Israeli attack scenarios – see Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. In the latter I concluded that an Israeli attack that didn’t overfly airspace under U.S. control was feasible.)

The quoted article was neither the first nor the only one where I asserted that the U.S. would not allow Israel to preempt against Iran. Yet, in none of those articles did I ever explicitly state what the U.S. would do to prevent the Israelis from attacking or what the U.S. would do if Israel attacked despite our disapproval. I’ll do that now.

I have always assumed that when U.S. and Israeli officials discuss an Israeli preemption, the U.S. representative states in the strongest possible language that such at attack would gravely affect U.S.-Israeli relations. The “grave” effects would include various forms of political and economic sanctions, such as cutting off sales of weapons and spare parts or cancellation of joint U.S.-Israeli weapons programs among others. So, “prevention” is achieved by the threat of sanctions and a cooling of relations. I expect the frequency of such discussions has increased over the past year or so as Iran approaches the “threshold” of nuclear capability (see, for example, Is there a “threshold”?). There is little doubt the Israelis have made clear to the U.S. they view Iran as an “existential threat” and that, irrespective of the consequences for future U.S.-Israeli relations, they will attack at some point if the U.S. doesn’t. The U.S. understands and appreciates this, and there the matter rests.

We’ve reached the point where, despite his statements that he wouldn’t leave Iran as a problem for the next President, it is very unlikely that Bush will act. Although we can’t completely rule out an aerial campaign starting in late November, Bush has probably decided that Iran is far enough from weapons capability that the next President can handle the problem. Bush is expecting history to vindicate him on Iraq and he’s not going to risk his legacy by giving his successor a new war to worry about on Inauguration Day.

In the extremely unlikely event that McCain is the guy taking the Oath of Office on 20 January, we can be confident that he will launch air strikes against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure at some point if diplomatic means fail. Obama’s statements that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable or that use of force can’t be ruled out are not, however, credible.

Obama is the candidate of the extreme left, which comprises a substantial group who are extremely anti-Israel. The virulence of anti-Israel rhetoric from this group rises to a level I call “proto-anti-Semitic”. Here are some examples: Israel has committed “genocide” against the Palestinians; pro-Israeli Jews are guilty of divided loyalties; American foreign policy is controlled by a Jewish cabal made up of ex-Democrats (that is, “neocons); and so on. “Proto-anti-Semitism” means the speaker is not anti-Semitic but has a grossly exaggerated view of the power, influence, and tribalism of American Jews that reinforces anti-Semitic stereotypes. Proto-anti-Semitism creates a favorable environment and cover for crypto-anti-Semitism, where the speaker is anti-Semitic but hides behind what is claimed is legitimate political discourse.

Though Obama has recently articulated the mainstream American view of Israel as a firm and trusted ally, there is pretty good evidence that Obama said what he really thinks about Israel when he was at a private gathering for Rashid Khalidi in 2003. The L.A. Times obtained a video of this event and used some quotes from speakers on the video for an article written several months back. An inside source says that the video includes comments from Obama, one of which is the statement that Israel is guilty of “genocide” against the Palestinians. This, it is claimed, is the reason that the L.A. Times doesn’t quote Obama and refuses to release a transcript.

That Obama might have said this in an unguarded moment is quite believable. He has had long associations – friendships, in fact – with proto- or crypto-anti-Semites. Moreover, some of his closest foreign policy and military advisors have expressed views that put them in one or the other category (in fairness to Obama, some of these advisers were asked to resign). Even advisors who are more circumspect in their statements have a long history of being very pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli.

Ultimately, whether or not Obama actually said that Israel is guilty of genocide (or secretly believes it), given the foreign policy team he has assembled, Obama can be expected to head the most anti-Israel administration in U.S. history. Obama expects to be successful in negotiations with Iran precisely because he will “understand” their position and acknowledge many of their grievances against Israel. For Obama, there will be no acceptance of the Israeli view that Iran is an existential threat and therefore no justification for an Israeli preemptive strike. After all, the Mullahs are reasonable and Obama can negotiate with them. Obama’s peace offensive would be derailed by any Israeli strike – even one that avoids U.S.-controlled airspace – because Iran will treat the U.S. as complicit. Unlike the Bush administration, which would, at worst, only apply some sort of political and/or economic sanctions after the fact, the Obama administration can’t permit any attack to take place under any circumstance. The only way to accomplish this is to threaten to actively defend Iran against an Israeli attack – to threaten to shoot down Israeli jets whether they overfly Iraq or not.

Such an unprecedented act by a U.S. administration would be very unpopular and the Obama administration would not make the threat against Israel public. That won’t make any difference – Israeli officials are guaranteed to leak it.

The six month time frame fits in very well with this scenario. Obama and his crew will be sticking with the flawed NIE assessment on Iran. Israel won’t. Israel has indicated publically that it is close to attacking and privately may have given something close to a drop dead date - late Spring or early Summer 2009 would be a good bet. It can be assumed that either candidate intelligence briefings or briefings Biden may have received by virtue of his chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will have provided this information. Israel will have a nuclear capability threshold in mind, even if the U.S. doesn’t.

Once the U.S. threat is leaked, what then? Obama will have a political crisis on his hands. How will it play out? Obama cannot afford to back down. He’ll have to publically acknowledge that he has given shoot down orders in the event of an Israeli attack and he’ll have to stick by it. Would Israel test him? I’d guess the answer is no.

How would Congressional Democrats react to Obama’s approach? Would they require a reciprocal U.S. guarantee to Israel in the event Iran were to launch a nuclear attack? It’s hard to say. However, if Obama does prevent an Israeli attack and does enter into negotiations, Iran will get its nukes. Expect a rapid “breakout” and Iran fitting a half-dozen or so nukes on ballistic missiles. At that point we move into the sorts of nuclear scenarios I’ve discussed previously on this blog.

Given that Iran should probably have a dozen or more thermonuke-tipped ICBM’s sometime during a 2^nd Obama term (should he be reelected) and that Obama and the Democrats have stated they want to eliminate ballistic missile defense, we might even get to witness the Iranian “chicken” scenario”.

In my previous posting, I discussed why Obama and the Democrats might want to bring back the military draft. There was a public reason that would be offered but, behind it, there would be the intent to make the self-selected military organization more politically reliable. A few days later, and to my great surprise, I came across this piece on “the corner”, National Review Online’s blog. The article quotes Obama on the military draft:

And if you go to small towns, throughout the Midwest or the Southwest or the South, every town has tons of young people who are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. That’s not always the case in other parts of the country, in more urban centers. And I think it’s important for the president to say, this is an important obligation. If we are going into war, then all of us go, not just some.”

Obama correctly states that the people fighting are disproportionately from the small towns in flyover country - the red states. They aren’t from the urban areas. When Charles Rangel was advocating bringing back the draft a few years ago, he argued that people of color were disproportionately the ones fighting and dying. This was totally wrong. (Either Rangel was speaking out of ignorance or he was lying. As someone who has followed Rangel’s career over the years, I’d incline toward the latter view.) Note that Obama, unlike Rangel, gets it right. As with Obama’s statement to “Joe the Plumber”, I think Obama let his mask slip – he really is contemplating the need to create a politically reliable military.

In the previous post I said the following:

Do I think my worst case scenario will come to pass? Probably not – that’s why it is a “worst case” - but it is more likely than most people realize. The thing to keep in mind is that the unstated reasons for the policies I’ve mentioned need not be in the minds of most or even any of the people who enact them, including Obama, who is neither particularly smart nor any sort of strategic thinker.

I am retracting that last statement or, at least, modifying it. Obama is an ideologue – a Marxist radical – and I maintain that he is grotesquely ignorant of economics and foreign policy. However, he may well be a consummate political strategist. Consider that no one in modern U.S. history has been as signally unqualified to hold high office as Obama, yet he has risen faster than nearly every other Presidential aspirant (Teddy Roosevelt’s rise may be comparable). At the very least, Obama’s ascendancy bespeaks a high degree of political cunning.

Obama’s true genius is in self-promotion and the acquisition of power. He is exactly the sort of person the Framers had in mind when they put so many checks and balances into the Constitution. Today, most of those checks – those negative feedbacks – have been eliminated. Obama will have more scope for a malign ambition that any President in U.S. history.

Be afraid.

I never thought I’d find myself writing that I expect Barack Obama to be elected President but, unless his slip about “spreading the wealth” causes voters to realize that he is a thoroughgoing Marxist masquerading as a center-leftist, that is what is going to happen. Already, some commentators are beginning to contemplate what an Obama Presidency aligned with a Democratic Congress could mean. The Wall Street Journal opines in A Liberal Supermajority that profound changes of the New Deal or Great Society variety could be in the offing. Indeed. The article frets about a “filibuster-proof” Senate but it fails to understand that the filibuster is no longer a reliable check on the majority Party.

Back in 2005, I criticized the GOP for “strategic ineptitude” when it proposed the “nuclear” or “constitutional” option to eliminate judicial filibusters. Quoting from my conclusion:

The Democrats wanted to eliminate the filibuster in 1995 before it became a useful tool for them. Now that the GOP has shown how easy it would be to change the Senate rules, the filibuster has become a dead man walking that can be executed anytime a simple majority of Senators has the political will to do it. By not following through the GOP has invited the Democrats to eliminate the filibuster when it will favor them.”

In fact, if the Democrats have 50 Senators (plus Joe Biden for a tie-break) to change the rules and eliminate the filibuster rule then they can do so. Moreover, they need not limit it to judicial appointments.

Eliminating the filibuster brings on all of the dire consequences listed in the WSJ article but the article only scratches the surface of what is possible. It is probably the case that most of the proposals would pass constitutional muster given stare decisis and three generations of leftward drift in constitutional jurisprudence. However, I think it is possible that the so-called Fairness Doctrine might no longer find favor with the 4 conservative justices plus semi-conservative Anthony Kennedy. No worries. Obama & Co. merely resurrect FDR’s Court packing idea.

The Constitution doesn’t specify a number of Supreme Court Justices. Article III, in fact, only requires that a Supreme Court be created. (The composition, organization, and even the existence of lower Courts are completely at the discretion of Congress.) Accordingly, President Obama and the Democrats could decide to add 4 Justices. These 4 would be in their mid-to-late 30’s and the most radical, living-document ideologues available in left-wing academia. Unconstrained by the ridiculous doctrine of stare decisis (I happen to agree about stare decisis), they can overturn Heller and any other troublesome impediment to our Glorious Leader’s vision.

Obviously, if there is sufficient public outcry, these things won’t happen. However, if Obama and the Democrats are given what appears to be a mandate for change, expect that it will be exploited. The Democratic leadership of Congress is very left-wing so everything will hinge on the ideological composition of the House and Senate Democrats – especially the latter – as well as the power of the Democratic leadership. Exploiting economic fears of the general public can make it much easier to achieve pliancy from the blue dogs so don’t underestimate what is possible.

We already know that Obama’s vision includes things like compulsory service. Any argument for compulsory non-military service would apply to military service for reasons of fairness and equity, if nothing else. The system would probably allow citizens to choose between military or peaceful domestic service. Charles Rangel and other Democrats have been pushing for a military draft for years so it already has support. The unstated reason for bringing back the draft is that the volunteer Army is ideologically conservative and combat units are disproportionately white and from “red states”. An organization that overwhelmingly votes Republican and probably takes its oath to defend the Constitution seriously might take action against a Marxist putsch and, therefore, has to be neutered.

Assuring a permanent Democratic-socialist majority would also entail rigid control of the internet. Hillary and others have tried to do this before on the pretext of protecting minors from violence and porn. The new Supreme Court will let nearly any regulation of internet speech stand and that will make an enhanced version of campaign finance regulation that applies to the internet easy to enact.

Of course, at any point, a couple of million dedicated citizens could go to D.C., filling the streets and shutting down the federal government by peaceful means. My view is that the citizenry is far too decadent to do anything so the radical changes I’ve posited will not be effectively resisted when peaceful means would suffice. No, the people most likely to fill the streets are the “worst [who] are full of passionate intensity” – the Marxist and eco-fascist zealots.

Madison said, “Oppressors can tyrannize only when they achieve a standing army, an enslaved press, and a disarmed populace.” The press is largely enslaved (if that’s the term for willing tools) already and Barack & Co. can complete the process as indicated above. The standing army exists but, like the press, can be made politically reliable or, at least, no threat to the government. That leaves the armed populace. If I am right that a worst case scenario doesn’t initially generate massive peaceful demonstrations, what is the likelihood that people will actually risk their lives when the disarming process starts?

Do I think my worst case scenario will come to pass? Probably not – that’s why it is a “worst case” - but it is more likely than most people realize. The thing to keep in mind is that the unstated reasons for the policies I’ve mentioned need not be in the minds of most or even any of the people who enact them, including Obama, who is neither particularly smart nor any sort of strategic thinker. As with any other system, a feature in a political system that serves one purpose can have other purposes as well.

Anyone who has been paying attention should be aware that Barack Obama is a radical Marxist with a hypertrophied ego. He could easily become the thing the Founders most feared: a cult-of-personality leader and a Caesar - a U.S. version of Hugo Chavez. The only question that remains is will he be given the power?

The latest on Sarah Palin is that she may have considered censoring books at the town library when she became mayor of Wasilla, Alaska back in 1996. At present, to quote the Boston Herald), “[t]he stories are all suggestive, but facts are hard to come by.”

Did Palin actually ban books at the Wasilla Public Library? No one has adduced any evidence that she did. The Boston Herald notes that when questioned at the time by the town newspaper, Palin said her “inquiries” were rhetorical. The only reason this story has any legs is that the librarian was one of several people Palin asked to resign because they had been past supporters of her opponent in the mayoral election. This gives the appearance that Palin was punishing the librarian for being unwilling to comply with possible censorship demands. Let me reiterate that no one is claiming Palin actually called for the censorship of any book – she merely asked if the librarian would do so upon request.

If this story that Palin was trying to intimidate the librarian into censoring books is true, I would find it troubling but hardly a deal breaker. I don’t put it in the same category as Hillary Clinton in 2005, stating ex officio as the junior Senator from New York, that Congress should regulate videogames and other interactive media (see New junk science from the APA). There was absolutely no ambiguity about Hillary’s position, which directly violates the U.S. Constitution.

The fact that Palin denied back in 1996, when the issue arose, that she had any intent to censor books suggests that, even if she did, she rethought it and decided not to act. Unless this is part of a larger pattern of Clinton-style abuse of power, I’m inclined to do no more than flag it and move on.

Since my last posting, the oil bubble has indeed burst as predicted, falling nearly 1/3 from the high point. Even though this has dropped gasoline prices below $4/bbl, the public continues to favor domestic drilling.

Meanwhile, in the Presidential contest, Barack Obama picked Senator Joe Biden and McCain picked Alaska Governor Sarah Palin as their respective running mates. Both picks surprised me.

It’s hard to imagine a worse pick than Biden, a pompous blowhard and non-stop gaff machine. If Obama wasn’t going to pick Hillary – a mistake in my view – then he should have picked a respected, center-left DLC type like Evan Bayh. I believe that Obama chose Biden because he wanted someone who wouldn’t upstage him and who was also from the left wing of the party.

McCain’s choice of Palin surprised me only because I didn’t even think she was on his list. I became interested in Palin a few months ago. After watching videos of a 2006 Gubernatorial debate and later interviews on news shows in which she talked about energy policy, drilling in ANWR, and suing the EPA for putting the Polar Bear on the endangered list, I decided she should be on the ticket. That McCain chose Palin indicates that developing domestic energy resources is going to be one of his key issues – she has made herself an expert in oil and natural gas. I remain convinced that this is a winning issue for the GOP.

Last night, Palin gave her acceptance speech as the GOP Vice Presidential nominee. There has been all sorts of comment on Palin’s performance throughout the blogosphere – I’ll not add to it here except to say that it was generally well received. My wife and I watched the speech on C-SPAN and we digitally recorded it at the same time in the event that there was some sort of familial interruption. In the course of the speech, there were a number of shots of Palin from behind the podium, looking out over the crowd. From some of these behind-the-back shots, it was possible to see the teleprompter. I noted early on that what was on the teleprompter tracked what she was saying. Subsequently, there were several more shots in which the teleprompter was visible and nothing appeared amiss, though I can’t aver that I was paying it close attention after the first time I saw it working.

Today, a report circulated that Palin (and previous speaker Rudy Giuliani) had problems with the teleprompter such that scroll control was lost and it ran ahead of her place in the speech, making it unusable to her. This story was carried by major media including CNN, FOX, and the Wall Street Journal. Supposedly, an early ad lib (she said the difference between a “hockey mom” and a pit bull was lipstick) was associated with this failure. Since I’m very good at picking out obscure details in movies and videos and I hadn’t seen a failure, I wondered if this story was true. The only way to know for certain was to view the recording and see it showed the teleprompter had failed.

I’ve now run through the entire DVR of Palin’s speech and I can state that there is no evidence of an early failure or a failure half the way through that forced her to spend the rest of the time relying on her memory and her notes. Following is my “log” of the recording:

10:29 EDT – speech starts. I used the clock that was on the upper right of the C-SPAN image rather than the DVR time to track things so times are only to the nearest minute. Still, this should be close enough for someone else to verify my findings.

10:41 EDT – 12 minutes into speech – first shot of teleprompter, image was indistinct.

10:42 EDT – 13 minutes into speech – teleprompter visible and working.

10:47 EDT – 18 minutes into speech – teleprompter working.

10:50 EDT – 21 minutes into speech – teleprompter working.

10:54 EDT – 25 minutes into speech – teleprompter working

11:00 EDT – 31 minutes into speech – first shot I couldn’t see the teleprompter clearly. However, a few seconds later there was another shot and this time the teleprompter was visible and working.

11:08 EDT – Speech ends.

Every time that the teleprompter was visible it was working, by which I mean that the words on the teleprompter matched what Palin was saying. The teleprompter didn’t fail halfway through and then become unusable for the remainder of the speech. It is certainly possible that it may have gotten ahead or fallen behind on a few occasions but it was clearly functional shortly thereafter.

At a minimum, the claim that Palin had to do the last half of the speech without the teleprompter is busted. Considering that the video provides a sort of random sample of the teleprompter working throughout the speech, I’d say it is reasonable to question the weaker form of the claim that the teleprompter was failing intermittently though that claim may be true.

As I write this, the nominees presumptive of their respective parties are Barack Obama and John McCain. Although I fully expect the oil bubble to burst at some point in the not too distant future, with gasoline topping $4 a gallon, McCain and the Republicans have found a very strong issue in calling for the expansion of domestic oil exploration and easing restrictions on new refinery construction. What makes this issue so strong is that two-thirds of the public believe that offshore oil exploration should resume and, further, that it would reduce gasoline prices. Moreover, for over thirty years the Democratic Party has ”been in thrall to the eco-fascists” and has resolutely opposed expanding every conventional domestic energy source in favor of expensive and utterly impractical “alternatives”. Far from being the party of the working man, the Democratic Party is the party of the snail darter, the spotted owl, and the polar bear.

The Democrats have been thrown on the defensive and, unable to change their radical environmental, anti-technology ideology, have been forced to rely on bumper sticker rhetoric: “You can’t drill your way out of scarcity”. Worse, for them, some of their confreres are beginning to say what they really think: U.S. Representatives Maxine Waters of California and Maurice Hinchey of New York have called for nationalizing the oil industry or parts thereof. With Obama being the most left-wing member of the Senate, suspected by many of being a closet Marxist, this offers the GOP the perfect opportunity for a viral video and/or a commercial calling attention to the stark difference between the two parties. Here is what I envision:

FADE IN: A red flag with hammer and sickle is waving. An a cappella male chorus sings “The Internationale” in Russian (I like the first a cappella version here). First, a picture of Karl Marx appears. This fades and is replaced with a clip of Lenin speaking. There follows a clip of Stalin reviewing a May Day Parade, Krushchev banging his shoe at the U.N., Fidel Castro haranguing a crowd, Leonid Brezhnev reviewing yet another May Day Parade, then, abruptly the music stops in mid-phrase and there stands Ronald Reagan delivering the lines, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” Cut to a scene of cheering crowds tearing down the Berlin wall. FADE OUT
FADE IN: A clip of Maxine Waters threatening to [sic] “socialize” the oil companies. As she speaks, the camera should begin to pull back and it becomes apparent that the image is on a TV. This is replaced by Maurice Hinchey talking about nationalizing the oil refineries. Pulling back farther, the camera reveals a couple of guys (they should be identifiable as “Reagan Democrats” – t-shirts and/or baseball caps with union slogans) watching the TV. One turns to the other and says, “Gee, I thought we won the Cold War.”
FADE OUT: The words, “VOTE REPUBLICAN” appear.

I think this could easily be a 60 second commercial though it would work as a 2 minute viral video as well.

If anyone in the RNC reads this, I give you full rights to put it together. If anyone else wants to make it, contact me first.

Although it has been an interesting political season, even the prospect of an Obama-Hillary / Hillary-Obama shotgun wedding officiated by Howard Dean has been insufficient to motivate me to blog. However, a couple of recent events merit some commentary.

The first was from early last month when Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, admitted that the release of the Key Judgments summary of the NIE to the public created the false impression that Iran was no longer developing nuclear weapons. During the questioning by Senator Evan Bayh (D – Indiana), the following exchange occurred:

MR. MCCONNELL: I think I would change the way that we describe nuclear program; I mean, put it up front, a little diagram, what are the component parts so that the reader could quickly grasp that a portion of it, I would argue, maybe even at least significant portion, was halted and there are other parts that continue.

SEN. BAYH: Well, just to clarify the record, and I’m referring only to the public NIE. And I’ve read it. My synopsis of it — and I’d be interested if any of you would disagree with this — was that they had an active — all three components: fissile material creation, weaponization, delivery systems. All those were going forward. They decided a few years ago to suspend one component; as you characterize it, the least consequential of the three — at least temporarily they decided to suspend it. They could recommence that at any point in time.

MR. MCCONNELL: They could.

SEN. BAYH: It would be very difficult for us, as I think you pointed out, to know when they have recommenced that, and ultimately, given their industrial and technological capabilities, they are likely to be successful. We don’t know exactly when, but ultimately they’re likely to be successful.

MR. MCCONNELL: Yes, sir.

SEN. BAYH: Is that a fair synopsis?

MR. MCCONNELL: That’s exactly right. And that’s what the unclassified — if you read them all the way through, that’s unclassified key judgment — make that point, and then there’s the full body of the 140 pages also, and (they did make that ?) point.

SEN. BAYH: Well, so my question to you is, you know, it’s difficult when we just, you know, have one footnote that kinds of clarifies, as I say — how can you and your people go about presenting this in a way that is more likely to have a balanced presentation of your beliefs, to avoid the kind of problem we’ve now got ourselves in going forward? And how can you think through the consequences of the report? Because it’s had unintended consequences that in my own view are damaging to the national security interests of our country.

MR. MCCONNELL: Sir, it’s a challenge. We tried, in the time we had left, to do just what you said. I thought at the moment, at that point in time, we had gotten good balance. In retrospect, I — as I mentioned, I would do some things differently.

[Emphasis added, otherwise unedited]

We need not concern ourselves with the remainder of the exchange, where McConnell offers the absurd and self-serving argument that the release of the Key Judgments summary didn’t damage U.S. national security by making it more difficult to pressure Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

The establishment media gave McConnel’s admissions about the NIE scant coverage – obviously it was too embarrassing for journalists to acknowledge both their excessive credulity and ignorance about such an important topic. Besides, given the political bias of the media, the fact that so many prominent Democrats – in particular, Democratic Presidential candidates – relied on the flawed NIE to attack the Bush Doctrine undermines their claims of foreign policy expertise. It is only acceptable for the establishment media to question Bush’s expertise.

The second development is that there is good reason to question the NIE’s assertion that weaponization, in the form of warhead development, was halted by Iran in 2003. Recall that back in December, I stated my view that warhead development had not ceased at all. Now, a 13 March 2008 article in Jane’s International Defense Review (paid subscription required) titled “Evidence emerges of Iran’s continued nuclear weapons research” vindicates my assertion. Jane’s claims to have seen evidence of long term weapons development from “a source connected to a Western intelligence service” and that said evidence was “verified by a number of reliable independent sources in Vienna.” This evidence relates to developments in the implosion technology necessary for a plutonium device and essential in reducing the amount of fissile material needed for a uranium device. According to Jane’s, Iran has made “great strides” in this critical technology. Further, this weaponization program has been ongoing, which flatly contradicts the NIE “judgment” that Iran suspended that part of nuclear program back in 2003. Q.E.D.

The article goes on to discuss the organization of the weapons program (known as AMAD - full Farsi name: Sazemaneh Tarhe Amade Vije - Organisation for Planning and Special Supplies, OPSS) as well as specifics about the technologies under development. Aside from implosion technology, AMAD, is also developing a “payload with a diameter of 60 cm” with an eye toward fitting this inside the conical warhead of the Shahab-3”. Jane’s notes that this is a departure from the “tri-conic” or baby bottle warhead variants observed 3 years ago in a military parade which were thought to be a nuclear warhead design.

About the only positive thing that can be said about the state of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is that its schedule has been “moving to the right” and is progressing slower than might be expected. This is no argument in favor of complacency. Iran is obviously very close to having fully weaponized nuclear – I maintain thermonuclear – devices. If Bush doesn’t take action, it will probably be too late for the next President to do anything except develop policies for how to deal with a nuclear Iran.

I hadn’t planned to comment on the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate – others with much better credentials than I have done so (notably John Bolton in the Washington Post). However, none of them offered the best refutation, although Henry Kissinger in a 13 December editorial came close. Kissinger pointed out that the “Key Judgments” part of the NIE that was released to the public had its most widely quoted statement footnoted with information that it was the construction of warheads that Iran had halted. This, said Kissinger, is only one aspect of a nuclear weapons program and “not even the most significant one.”

The Key Judgments is only a few pages, most of which is explanatory material for a few conclusory statements. The only one that matters is “A”, which begins:

A. We judge with high confidence that in the fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program;…

This phrase is footnoted:

For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.

So, what does “design and weaponization” mean? Kissinger is correct that this relates to having a nuclear device that can be deployed in the field and used as a weapon. For example, the first true thermonuke (that is, hydrogen bomb) was a huge construction of piping and cryotanks that used liquid hydrogen. This U.S. built device could never be used a weapon. When the Soviets detonated their first thermonuke it was a lithium deuteride “dry bomb” dropped from a bomber. Thus, although the U.S. detonated the first thermonuke, the Soviets were first to weaponize.

Kissinger and the other critics have said Statement A greatly overstates the case. I believe the better argument is that the qualifying footnote’s assertion concerning design and weaponization is wrong. This can be shown by reference to open, unclassified sources.

In September of this year, the Iranians held a military parade at which a supposedly new missile called the Ghadr was put on display. Jane’s (paid subscription only) had an article about this “new” missile, which analysts said was actually a modified version of the Shahab-3 missile first seen in 2004. Here are some details from a December 2004 article in Jane’s Defense Weekly:

The missile has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device. Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation and visually appears similar to that used on the Russian SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. “It is not a copy of a known missile but the new Shahab has a major-league design. It’s clear that it is the work of seasoned missile engineers, probably Russian, rather than an experimental beginners ” version, added Rubin.

Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country’s first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests. The weapon is believed by US officials to be an indigenous design although knowledge gained from blueprints of a working, but too large nuclear weapon, provided by the Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan would be helpful to the effort. If true, the efforts would signify that IRAN is further advanced in its nuclear weapons programme than previously known.

According to the 2004 article, the program to develop the improved Shahab delivery system was called Ghadr-101. It is significant that the missile on display in 2007 is called the Ghadr. It suggests that what was seen in 2004 was a prototype and the 2007 version is the production model. Ironically, the missile in the parade had written on it, “Israel must be eliminated.”

Elsewhere on this blog, I’ve written about Iranian missile development. I’ve also said that the Iranians would almost certainly deploy 1 megaton thermonukes at the start – all it takes is 7 to obliterate Israel. Missile and warhead technology is probably the most difficult technology to master. The evidence is overwhelming that the Iranians have accomplished this. The biggest technological hurdle in building a uranium-based, first generation thermonuke is amassing enough highly enriched uranium. The Iranians have enrichment technology in hand – even the writers of the NIE acknowledge that Iran already has enough centrifuges to construct a U-235 weapon by 2009. This, too, is an overestimate - assuming that Iran installs no more centrifuges the date would be late 2008 – as I’ve shown in several previous blog entries, assuming only standard centrifuges, 3,000 will produce around 30 kg of highly enriched uranium (advanced centrifuges might produce close to twice this amount). Right now, the Iranians probably have a number of warheads waiting only for uranium, polonium-210, and tritium to turn them into weapons.

If the missile that will carry the thermonuke has been in a military parade open to the foreign press, why doesn’t the Intel bureaucracy know about it? John Bolton suggests that the writers of the NIE had a political motive. Possibly. However, I attribute it to the fact that bureaucracies are amplifiers of stupidity.

From their inception, the CIA and its siblings in civilian intelligence have demonstrated a remarkable inability to gather accurate information about our adversaries. The Soviets detonated their first A-bomb years ahead of the estimate provided by the Intel bureaucrats. The Intel bureaucrats were surprised again when the Soviets air dropped their first thermonuke – it was a double surprise because the Soviet thermonuke was fully weaponized, which briefly put the Soviets technically ahead of the U.S. Of course, most people know about the CIA-organized Bay of Pigs fiasco and there’s even a movie satirizing declassified information about the CIA’s laughable attempts to kill Castro. Most recently we have the missing stockpiles of WMD’s in Iraq. These are just a few examples off the top of my head – to properly catalogue the instances of CIA/Intel ineptitude over the past 60 years would require multiple volumes. Some historian really should undertake the task.

The evidence in the public domain that Iran is very close to having thermonukes and a way to put them on target is overwhelming. The fact that the Israeli government, which has access to classified information, has taken the unprecedented step of trying to convince the American government to repudiate the NIE’s conclusion should be considered dispositive.

At this critical time, the NIE has apparently so cowed George W. Bush that he has abandoned the Bush doctrine. We are now living in the worst of all possible worlds. The U.S. will not denuclearize Iran and, by sitting athwart the best attack routes, makes it nearly impossible for Israel to take action. If there is a nuke war in the Mid-East, what will be the consequence for the Intel agencies? The answer is: nothing. Actually, failure usually brings more funding – “if only we’d had more money we could have done a better job.” The stupidity of bureaucracies – especially government ones – is essentially limitless except for one area: self-preservation.

I’m back after a rather long hiatus. I spent the summer on involuntary vacation: I was laid off from my job at Crane. During my layoff I didn’t feel much like writing, though I did step up my exercise regimen and lost some weight. After I got a new position at Crane in September, I remained unmotivated. Yesterday, I came across an article in Jane’s – subscription through Crane – dealing with a subject I’ve previously discussed at length on this blog: whether or not Israel is capable of successfully launching a denuclearization attack on Iran. Quoting Jane’s: “While Israel’s rhetoric on this possibility is vigorous, the feasibility of such an operation is extremely low.”

Following are the main points in the Jane’s analysis:

• Natanz is roughly 1550 km from the nearest Israeli base.
• The 25 F-15I aircraft have an operational range of around 2000 km without drop tanks.
• The 102 F16I aircraft delivered and on order have a comparable range when fitted with conformal fuel tanks.
• The IAF has only 4 KC-707 and 3 KC-130 tankers available, which limits the ability of Israeli jets to loiter over the target(s).
• All routes to the target lead to countries not likely to allow over flights. Most probable would be along Iraqi-Saudi border, which increases the range by around 300 kilometers.
• For the above and other reasons, any attack is likely a “one-off” single wave of strike aircraft.
• Iranian air defense capability is limited but would still create operational challenges given the limited size of the Israeli strike and possible diversion of strike aircraft to defense.
• Somewhere from 50 to 100 penetrators could be put on target at Natanz, lack of intel about the buried facility may limit the damage.
• Since the Israeli strike would fly through airspace controlled and/or monitored by the U.S., Israeli-U.S. collusion would be assumed, generating all manner of adverse political “blowback”.

There is really nothing in the Jane’s analysis that I haven’t already discussed before. I am rather more sanguine about the direct route attack on Natanz (and Arak, which Jane’s didn’t mention) being successful than is Jane’s. Otherwise, I generally concur with the analysis, with a few minor quibbles. I’ll accept Jane’s tanker number. However, one possibility I’ve considered but not heretofore written about is that Israeli might use some number of its F-16A/B/C/D aircraft as tankers by fitting them with buddy packs. This could significantly ease the operational constraints and allow the Israelis to put more bombs on target.

I doubt that Israeli intel is problematic, as the Jane’s analysis suggests. Israeli intel is generally superb and, if a History Channel documentary aired a few days ago titled “Beyond Top Secret: Iran” is accurate, the Mossad actually tipped off the Iranian dissidents about where to look for the main Iranian nuclear facilities back in 2002. The History Channel documentary also discussed how Israel could achieve better results with its bunker busters: by double targeting. Because the bunker busters are so accurate, the first one blows a hole above the buried structure and the second goes into that hole and penetrates the structure before exploding. I didn’t discuss this possibility previously either, although I did discuss it with friends offline.

Everyone knows that only the U.S. can do a thorough job against Iran - the U.S. can not only take out the entire nuclear infrastructure but attrition the military and political infrastructure as well. What I’ve previously termed “active deterrence” requires that Iran’s military capabilities be severely degraded and Bush will have to act very soon. It will be too late to do anything if it’s left to the next President whomever he or she happens to be.

I generally try to avoid religious arguments unless provoked or moved by a need to correct a misconception. Thus, in Idiotic Design versus Theistic Evolution I addressed the popular misconception that Darwin’s Theory of evolution by natural selection is incompatible with belief in a creator deity. Now comes one Doug Giles who is both provocative and wrong in his column Hey, Atheists … Get your own moral code.

Giles’ article responds to critics of an earlier article he wrote (unread by me) in which he apparently asserted that non-believers are ipso facto immoral. In other words, he retailed the common misconception of religious folk that morality cannot exist without a deity. I touched on this topic briefly in my piece on an Israeli nuclear deterrence strategy I termed MAD with a vengeance. In discussing the “morality” of massive retaliation, I said, “A more useful (that is, scientific and objective) way of looking at morality is to say that it is evolved behavior in social animals that promotes survival.” I then talked about the idea of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) and offered Hillel’s formulation of the Golden Rule as an example of an ESS. The choice of the Golden Rule was deliberate since it is found in one form or another in every religious system on Earth.

The concluding paragraph in Giles’ article states his thesis:

So what’s it going to be, my obstreperous amigos? Are you going to continue to blather on about there being no God and then live like there is one and that His word and will matters? Get consistent, why don’t ‘cha? Don’t live by the Ten Commandments. Don’t live by the Golden Rule. Don’t do unto others as you would have them do unto you. That’s our stuff. That’s the Judeo-Christian way. Get your own commandments that are logically deduced from the “no God” hypothesis, write your own unholy book and form your own civilization. Then let’s see how appealing it is, how it betters the planet and how far you’ll get.

Giles seems to be almost completely unaware that the moral core of Christianity predates that particular religion or its lineal progenitor, Judaism. In fact, “moral” behavior can be observed not only in our Great Ape cousins but also in other intelligent social animals. Pre-scientific explanations for what humans see in nature – and themselves – have taken the form of magic or religion. Codifying natural “moral” behavior that humans were already exhibiting into a “religion” fits into this pattern.

Giles also makes the common mistake of confusing objectively defined moral or ethical behavior (such as the Golden Rule ESS) with idiomatic religious observance. Prohibitions against intra-group violence are ubiquitous among humans. In non-humans, intra-group mating contests tend to be highly ritualized and generally non-lethal. This is because too much intra-group violence and other “anti-social” behavior compromises group solidarity and the survival/breeding advantage it confers. So the prohibition against killing found in the Ten Commandments is an obvious manifestation of an evolutionarily established “moral” behavior. But what of the admonition against worshiping other gods in the First Commandment? This is feature of one of the earliest known monotheistic religions, Judaism, but makes no sense in the context of a polytheistic religion such as Hinduism. I suppose that a fundamentalist Christian can claim that Hindus are “immoral” but there is no objective basis for such a claim. Moreover, as is painfully obvious to non-Christians (especially Jews), the idea of a Trinity doesn’t comport with the idea of One God. It may be that this idea of multiple aspects of the One God is a doctrinal remnant of the syncretism by which early Christianity spread itself. Christianity, which originated as a Jewish heresy, was able to establish itself among pagan polytheists by adopting elements of their belief systems. Since many of these systems had multiple gods (for example, the Roman and Greek pantheon, the Nordic pantheon, etc.) it was functional to adopt some of those elements into Christianity. Judaism, in contrast, doesn’t proselytize and only spreads by maintaining a reasonably high birth rate within a tight community of believers. This explains many of the contradictions one finds in the Christian variants of Jewish observance, such as the Christian modification of the First Commandment. Given the very rapid spread of Christianity its early history, it is unsurprising to find the multiple deity components are most apparent in its oldest sect: Catholicism has all manner of demi-gods or “Saints” with semi-divine powers.

But, we need not dwell on Giles’ confusion about what constitutes moral behavior to see that his central argument is uninformed. Given that science adequately explains that moral behavior is evolved behavior, the fact is that it is believers – Christians included – and not atheists and agnostics, who are “borrowing” their moral code.

A little over a month ago, Iran announced it could enrich uranium on an “industrial scale”. In short order, IAEA inspectors were shown 8 cascades, amounting to 1,312 centrifuges, operating within the bowels of the subterranean Natanz enrichment facility. Yesterday, the New York Times reported, Atomic Agency Concludes Iran is Stepping Up Nuclear Work. The IAEA now says that Iran is installing a 164 centrifuge cascade each week and could have 8,000 operating by year’s end – assuming no increase in the installation rate. The most recent report states that the IAEA was able to sample the product stream and it was low enriched, reactor grade uranium – unsuitable for a bomb which, practically speaking, needs to be in the mid-to-high 90% range (20% is theoretically enough but totally impractical for military purposes). Still, 8,000 centrifuges – even low tech ones – can produce around 80 kilograms of weapons grade uranium a year, enough for several bombs.

The New York Times article mentions that Iran may be going for “breakout” capability. In the world of nuclear non-proliferation, breakout refers to the ability of a civilian nuclear program under full IAEA safeguards to rapidly transition to a military weapons program. Many signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) having no weapons program whatsoever can go to full scale weapons production in a few months should they choose to do so (for example, Belgium, Germany, and Japan fall into this category). Should Iran manage to get the U.S. and the international community to accept its “civilian” program – and under the NPT there is really no reason why they shouldn’t – then Iran could put Natanz under full IAEA safeguards until it has its 50,000 centrifuges operating. The speed with which the cascades could be reconfigured from low enriched uranium to weapons grade uranium is speculative but let’s say that it takes a month – it should almost certainly take much less time than this. Once reconfigured, the 50,000 centrifuges would output over 40 kilograms of weapons grade uranium a month. The Iranians could play all manner of games to prevent inspectors from monitoring their activities though their intent would be obvious. The amount of time for Iran to have enough material for its first bomb could be 6 weeks. Iran would have almost certainly prepared for this breakout so 6 weeks would be the time required to insert the uranium into the completed bomb and stick it on top of a ballistic missile.

Of course, Iran could prevent inspectors from accessing the product stream at any point and switch to a slow-motion breakout strategy that would give it several weapons early next year. At present, the strategic initiative rests solely with Iran. This became the case as soon as Iran was allowed to spin up its centrifuges with impunity.

Over the lifetime of this blog and before, going back to late 2002 or early 2003, I have written that the Bush Doctrine called for neutralizing terrorist states with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Neutralizing means either changing the government or removing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons – or both.

As the Bush administration has had to adjust to changing political fortunes, both at home and abroad, it has appeared to lose focus on the goals of the Bush Doctrine. The reasons for the administration’s political difficulties are as manifold as they are obvious, for example: the immediate failure to find “stockpiles” of poison gas in Iraq, the rise of sectarian violence in postwar Iraq, the paralysis of the Iraqi government, and so on. These and other problems – such as the President’s deficient communication skills - have made it difficult for Bush to change the subject to Iran.

The success or failure of the Bush Doctrine hinges on Iran and the range of options available to the administration has been significantly reduced over the past two years. Congress is never going to authorize the sort of open ended authority it gave the President for dealing with Iraq – authority that amounted to a declaration of war. The only option remaining is for the President to use his authority as Commander in Chief to launch an aerial campaign designed to eliminate the nuclear threat and, perhaps, to attrition the Iranian military in the process. Most Democrats in Congress would welcome such a campaign as would Sunni Arab states and most, if not all, of the member states of the European Union. None are willing to support it publicly – “let Bush do it and take the heat” seems to be the consensus view.

Can “Bush do it” without Congressional approval? The short answer is, “yes”. In Libertarians! Embrace your inner Republican!, I said that Jefferson’s undeclared war against the Barbary Pirates was based upon Article II powers given to the President as Commander-in-Chief. Presidential candidate Senator Joe Biden has said that the President may launch preemptive strikes to defend U.S. forces from attacks originating in or supported by Iran. Even if some members of Congress want to oppose the President, under the War Powers Act, the President can commit troops for 60 days before Congress can force a withdrawal. The focus of the War Powers Act seems to be ground troops – boots on the ground – and an air campaign, even with SpecOps, probably wouldn’t activate its provisions (even if it does, there would be plenty of room for legalistic wrangling that could take months to resolve).

Assuming that Bush still intends to destroy Iran’s nuclear program before it fabricates its first nuke, the question is, when? Since Bush & Co. didn’t attack before the first centrifuge spun inside the hardened facility, it means that some threshold number of centrifuges must exist before military action will be sanctioned. At 50,000 centrifuges, Iran could easily produce its first bomb between inspections, such would be the production rate. Irrespective of the breakout problem, allowing Iran to install all 50,000 would so undermine the U.S. position as to make it unlikely that the U.S. would do anything to prevent Iran from going nuclear. The threshold must, therefore, be less than 50,000.

At 8,000 centrifuges, Iran could produce its first bomb in two or three months. This offers very little time for the U.S. to respond, particularly with Iran’s likely gaming of the inspections regime. Thus, 8,000 would have to be the upper threshold for U.S. action. I’d put it lower – around 6,000 – assuming regular assays of the output stream by the IAEA. In any case, this means that we are fast approaching the point at which the U.S. will strike. If the MOP (which I mentioned in this article) is deployed on schedule, it would be available for use on the Natanz bunkers around the time Iran crosses the centrifuge threshold – sometime in the September or October time frame.

If the U.S. doesn’t attack by that point, it’s not going to attack. That’s when Israel will step up to the plate if it hasn’t already done so.

On 23 March 2004, a buddy of mine sent me Iraq One Year Later by Republican Representative Ron Paul of Texas. He wanted to know what I thought of it. I sent him back a response in the form of my comments interlineated with Paul’s article. Now that Paul is a candidate for the GOP Presidential nomination and highly ranked in the non-scientific Pajamas Media Presidential Straw Poll, I thought it might be a good time to post this. My responses are in “red” font.

The Iraq war began about one year ago with the swift and decisive overthrow of Baghdad and the Hussein regime. We are only beginning to understand, however, the true scope of our ongoing occupation of a nation rife with civil, ethnic, and tribal conflict. July stands as the deadline for our provisional government to relinquish control to an emerging Iraqi government, but we are kidding ourselves about just how long American forces will need to remain involved.

More than 580 Americans have died in Iraq; roughly 10,000 have been wounded. American taxpayers have spent hundreds of billions of dollars. We must not be afraid to face these facts and understand the terrible cost of war.

Were these sacrifices worth it? To answer that question, we have to look at the justifications given for our invasion of Iraq.

One justification was that Saddam Hussein ignored United Nations Security Council resolutions. Whether this was true or not was none of our concern. America should never act at the behest of the UN or help enforce its illegitimate edicts. America should never commit troops to any UN action. We should not even be a member of the UN, but rather should ignore it completely. Membership in the UN is incompatible with our Constitution and national sovereignty. It was nonsensical for conservatives suddenly to cite Iraq’s purported lack of cooperation with the UN as justification for war.

I basically agree with Paul here with respect to the U.N. — the U.S. should have never promoted the organization and/or joined it. I’d like to see the U.S. extricate itself from the U.N. In my view, we didn’t need to involve the U.N. to go into Iraq. Having said that, had I been the President, instead of Bush, I would have followed a similar strategy — with the exception being that I would have asked for a declaration of war. I would have used the intrasigence of the U.N. permanent Security Council members to provide political cover for getting the U.S. out of the U.N. American antitudes toward the U.N. in the run-up to Gulf War II were such that pulling out would have been easy. Even now, all of the dirt that is coming out about the Oil-for-Food program could be useful in discrediting the U.N., though I think the moment has passed to whip up public support for getting out.

The second justification for invading Iraq was that Mr. Hussein posed a threat to the United States. This was not true. Hussein had only a small army, and virtually no navy or air force. He had no long-range weapons and no ability to strike the US 6,000 miles away. He was not working with bin Laden or al Qaeda terrorists. He was a despicable tyrant at home, but the liberation of Iraq from his clutches was given as a new justification only after the American public had absorbed overwhelming evidence that he posed no threat to us.

I’m glad that Paul didn’t say “imminent threat”. However, Hussein was going to be a threat at some point in the future. Let’s review a little history. In 1947 or thereabouts, the Cold War got started. The Soviets had a huge conventional army but we had the bomb and we had a delivery system. The U.S. had the power at that point to say to the Soviets, “Get the hell out of Europe and get behind your borders. And, by the way, we’re going to send in inspection teams to keep tabs on you because, we’re not going to allow you to have either nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them.” Russia would have collapsed a hell of a lot faster if we’d done that. Alternatively, we could have acted just as soon as they detonated their first bomb and presented them with an ultimatum along the lines of the above. This would have been rational policy because (1) the Soviets were expansionist and (2) would have eliminated us in a New York minute if they had the power to do so. Allowing a mortal enemy to have nukes was not a far-sighted policy.

What Ron Paul fails to understand is how implacable our enemy is. They really want to destroy us, just as the Soviets did. This makes pre-emption the best strategy.

Is America better off as a result of our war in Iraq? The young men and women who were hurt or killed certainly are no better off. Their families are no better off. Taxpayers are no better off. Whether we are safer from terrorism here at home is an open question. We all hope and pray nothing happens. But even our own intelligence forces cautioned that an invasion and occupation of Muslim Iraq could breed resentment among sympathetic Muslims and serve as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda. As commentator Lew Rockwell states, “It is not caving in to the bees to stop poking a stick into their hive.”

America is better off. Libya has opened up its WMD programs for inspection and halted nuke development. The Iranians have reluctantly agreed to closer inspections. There are massive pro-democracy demonstrations in Syria. There are massive pro-democracy demonstrations in Iran as well. The internal contradictions of radical Islam are starting to tear it apart. This is a good thing. Ron Paul also fails to acknowledge that the opinion polls of the Iraqis indicate that they don’t harbor a lot of resentment against the U.S. Even more revealing is that the actual opinions of the U.S. in the Arab world are better now than they were pre-Gulf War II, though they are still negative. European opinions of the U.S. are way down but I say, “screw ‘em”.

The bee analogy is actually very good. The fact is, the Islamofascists are like killer bees and they were already buzzing. We had already been stung in 1993, then in 1998, and finally in 2000 before being stung in 2001. Once agitated these bees can’t be reasoned with, they can’t be bargained with, they don’t feel pity, or remorse, or fear, and they absolutely will not stop until you are dead. How many times are we going to allow ourselves to be stung before we whip out the DDT?

Are the Iraqis better off? Saddam is gone, along with his murderous cohorts, and that certainly presents a positive opportunity for the Iraqi people. But we cannot be sure that the Hussein regime will be replaced by something better. Iraq is still very unstable and divided between Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd factions. Civil war could ensue upon the departure of American troops.

Except that Iraq is going to become a semi-permanent U.S. base. I know that Ron Paul thinks we should pull out but that isn’t going to happen and our libertarian President wouldn’t do it in any case. The Iraqis should be given autonomy — as is happening — and a basing agreement should be signed. U.S. troops a short march away from every major Arab capital will send the appropriate message and embolden the pro-democracy elements in the respective countries.

Even if we assume that anything will be an improvement over the Hussein regime, the fundamental question remains: Why should young Americans be hurt or killed to liberate foreign nations? I have never heard a convincing answer to this question. If we sacrifice 500 lives to liberate Iraq, should we sacrifice five million American lives to liberate the people of North Korea, Taiwan, Tibet, China, Cuba, and countless African nations? Should we invade every country that has an oppressive government? Are nation-building and empire part of our national credo? Those who answer yes to these questions should have the integrity to admit that our founders urged the opposite approach, namely a foreign policy rooted in staying out of the affairs of other nations.

Americans have to die because we are at war and we have to win. Libertarianism is, first and foremost, based upon the idea that human nature doesn’t change. Experience tells us that utopian schemes based upon perfecting human nature will always fail. Ron Paul has fallen prey to a particular brand of utopianism — a quasi-pacifist isolationism that assumes that if we just go away, Islamofascism will no longer target us. If we pull out, we merely show weakness and validate the Islamofascist idea that we are decadent. Eventually, they will attack us again, and it will be worse the next time because we won’t be able to hit them back — they’ll be under their nuclear umbrella. I respect Ron Paul but I respectively disagree with both his characterization of the current situation and his analysis of how to address it.