Jane’s on a new Iran-Russia-China axis
An articled titled “An Iran-Russia-China Axis?” from Jane’s, 26 Oct 2005 (paid subscription required) discusses potential difficulties in realizing any U.N.-based action against Iranian nuclear proliferation.
The Kremlin is facing mounting pressure to reassess its position on Iran and decide whether short-term financial gains from technology transfers, most notably from the supply and construction of the nuclear power plants at Bushehr, are worth sacrificing improvements in its regional and international relations, particularly with the US. The IAEA’s vote in favour of referring the Islamic republic to the Security Council resulted in an abstention from Russia which has vehemently opposed Washington’s attempts to put the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions on the agenda.
Once a resolution to apply sanctions or other penalties is put before the Security Council, continuing abstention by Moscow will lead to deteriorating relations with the US administration. At the same time, anything other than an opposing vote is unlikely to satisfy Tehran. Recent US efforts to persuade Russia to take a harder line have failed.
As Jane’s notes, Russia has significant economic interests in Iran.
Russia appears ready to co-operate with both the USA and Iran in order to boost its trade relations with the two countries. Although Russia is also a leading oil exporter and therefore unlikely to be intimidated by Iranian threats to reduce oil sales, the Russian nuclear industry is dependent on the completion of Iran’s USD1 billion Bushehr project, which Moscow hopes will be followed by future billion-dollar contracts. Russia’s defence industries, also badly in need of an economic boost through exports, have also been selling weapons systems and aircraft to Iran.
In return, Tehran provides no support for Islamist insurgents in Russia’s troubled Northern Caucasus. The Kremlin may have to reassess its relationship with the Islamic republic should Tehran ever vary its strategy towards Islamic separatist movements on Russian territory. In addition, if Tehran were to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, Iran would represent a potential security threat on Russia’s southern border.
For this reason, Russia has made it a condition of the Bushehr deal that Tehran returns all spent nuclear fuel from the reactors - which might otherwise be diverted for weapons programmes - back to Russia for reprocessing or warehousing. As Iran’s main nuclear technology supplier at present, it is believed that Russia has much more to gain by exerting pressure on Iran through threats to cut off nuclear supplies in order to persuade Tehran to forgo uranium enrichment and to co-operate further with the IAEA.
And then there’s China
Meanwhile, China is becoming even more dependent on Iran for energy. A November 2004 deal to supply China with gas worth USD100 billion is likely rise to a total of USD200 billion after a similar oil agreement is finalised. Iran will export 10 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) annually for 25 years in return for Chinese investment in exploration and drilling. This energy co-operation is rendering the US administration’s economic sanctions on Iran ineffective. However, the Russians must now assess the likelihood of being supplanted by China if they appear willing to trade favours with Washington and lose the confidence of Tehran. Iran may yet emerge as a leading member of a post-Cold War alliance which will work to undermine US regional objectives.
The Bush administration is aware of these problems. Why then is the administration involving the U.N.? There is no way the Security Council will permit military action against Iran. China and perhaps Russia will veto any proposal along those lines. I have long wondered if part of George W.’s long-term “strategery” is to either delegitimize the U.N. outright, setting the stage for the U.S. to leave the organization, or to force the U.N. to reform by continually demonstrating its fecklessness. The appointment of John Bolten as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. admits of either possibility.
One thing is certain: ultimately, the U.S. and its allies will have to act independently of the U.N.